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CAN TORT JURIES PUNISH COMPETENTLY?
Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide. By Cass R. Sunstein, Reid
Hastie, John W. Payne, David A. Schkade, and W. Kip Viscusi.
University of Chicago Press. 2002. Pp. 285. $35.00.
NEAL R. FEIGENSON*
INTRODUCrION
Jurors award punitive damages too often. The amounts they
award are erratic and unpredictable, even though they start from
shared moral intuitions about the reprehensibility of defendants'
conduct. And when they deliberate and decide as juries, both the size
and variability of the awards increase. These are among the main
findings from some twenty mock juror and jury experiments reported
in Punitive Damages, by Cass Sunstein, Reid Hastie, John Payne,
David Schkade, and W. Kip Viscusi. Equally important are the
reasons why jurors award punitives as they do. According to the
authors' studies, jurors frequently award punitives when experts (i.e.,
judges) would not because jurors tend to ignore the jury instructions
that specify the requirements for punitive liability. Jurors also exhibit
systematic biases in their evaluations of the ex ante riskiness of
defendants' conduct, often blaming defendants for behavior that was
cost-justified and thus, under the prominent deterrence theory of tort
liability, not even culpable, much less reprehensible. And lacking any
clear guidance as to how they should translate their urge to punish
into a specific dollar award, jurors resort to various flawed judg-
mental habits to reach unpredictable and arbitrary outcomes.
* Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law, and Research Affiliate, Yale
University Department of Psychology. I would like to thank Steve Gilles, Steve Latham, Linda
Meyer, Tony Sebok, Richard Sherwin, and Christina Spiesel for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article, and Dan Bailis and Jai Park for their guidance on the statistical issue
discussed infra on pages 253-54. I should disclose that about three years ago Cass Sunstein, the
lead author of the book under review, kindly agreed to read a prepublication copy of my own
book and to write a jacket blurb for it.
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The authors assert that their findings provide support for reforms
in the punitive damages process that would increase predictability
and avoid outlier judgments: more modestly, having judges determine
awards (or exercise greater oversight of jury awards) using awards in
similar cases as a standard; more ambitiously, replacing jury and
judge decision-making entirely with a quasi-administrative schedule
of awards based on guidelines developed by specialists in the relevant
subject matter areas. Given the authors' distinction and outstanding
achievement in their respective fields of scholarship, their recom-
mendations are likely to be taken seriously by judicial and/or legisla-
tive policy makers,' so it is worth considering their work very
carefully.
Punitive damages, and in particular, allegations that juries' puni-
tive awards are too frequent, too large, and too unpredictable, have
prompted much academic and political debate during the last twenty
years. The positions of many of the contributors to this debate,
including some of the authors of the book being reviewed, are well
known to those who follow these matters.2 New data, as social
psychologists have shown, may only further entrench the views of
those firmly on one side of a debate or the other,3 but experimental
research of the kind the authors have conducted can help everyone
else by pinpointing the effects of specific variables (such as case
features or jury instructions) whose impact is difficult to isolate in the
complexity of real-world trials and verdicts.
1. For instance, many of the studies reported in the book have been brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court in a case on punitive damages being decided this term. Brief of
Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002) (No. 01-1289). Cf. Neil Vidmar, Juries
Don't Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et al. on Punitive
Damages, 23 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 705, 713 (1999).
2. For instance, W. Kip Viscusi has published a paper titled Why There Is No Defense of
Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998) (cited in PUNITIVE DAMAGES at p. 246 n.7) (this and
all subsequent page references to PUNITIVE DAMAGES are in parentheticals in the body of the
text and footnotes), which was a response to criticisms by Theodore Eisenberg and David
Luban of another article by Viscusi in the same issue of that journal. In addition, the empirical
studies collected in PUNITIVE DAMAGES have previously been published in some ten articles
(pp. x-xi). Based on these publications if not also the partial sponsorship of the authors'
research by the ExxonMobil Corporation (p. ix), some readers of the book might anticipate the
authors' critical view of juries' punitive damages decision-making. I refuse to prejudge the book
in this fashion, and will evaluate the authors' research and arguments on their own merits.
3. The classic study is Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polariza-
tion: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979). For a more recent discussion, see Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in
the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, 49 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 259, 265-67 (1998).
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Taken as a whole, the research reported in Punitive Damages
represents a relatively comprehensive effort to describe with preci-
sion not just the outcomes of punitive damages assessments but also,
at least as importantly, the cognitive and social psychological proc-
esses that lead to those outcomes. The range of phenomena studied
is impressive. Some of the authors' findings, such as that jurors are
prone to rely on arbitrary numerical anchors in setting dollar figures
(chapter 4), are unsurprising, confirming the results of many previous
studies. Other findings-for instance, that deliberations increase both
the size of punitive awards (the "severity shift") and their variability
(chapter 3); that the less attention juries pay to the judges' instruc-
tions, the more likely they are to award punitives (chapter 5); and that
jurors are more, not less, likely to punish a defendant that they know
performed a competent cost-benefit analysis before acting (chapter
7)-are striking contributions to the literature. Moreover, the
concatenation of these findings to form an intelligible account of how
jurors arrive at their punitive awards is a valuable addition to our
knowledge of the topic. The authors' research in the aggregate
involved thousands of jury-eligible participants and, in the group
decision-making studies, hundreds of mock juries, enhancing the
reliability of the findings. The studies in general offer important
results that should be taken into account in subsequent debates about
punitive damages.
How the results should be interpreted is a somewhat different
matter. The authors4 use their research to argue that the arbitrariness
and unpredictability of juries' punitive damages awards constitute a
"serious problem" for the rule of law (p. 251), warranting corrective
measures. There is nothing wrong with using social scientific research
data to make an argument; it is certainly preferable to arguing
without data. Difficulties arise only to the extent that the argument
drives the interpretation of the data rather than the other way
around. The authors of Punitive Damages state at the outset that
"our principal goal is descriptive" (p. vii), and for the most part the
4. It may be perceived as misleading to generalize about "the authors" because different
persons are credited as authors of different chapters, including not only the five named authors
but also psychologist Daniel Kahneman, who collaborated on the work reported in three of the
chapters. For instance, deviations from the ideal of descriptive objectivity may vary by author
and/or chapter; in addition to the specific examples mentioned later in this Review, it seems to
me that Reid Hastie is the most temperate of the principal authors and Kip Viscusi the least
(although I have not conducted a systematic content analysis to test this impression). With this
caveat, I will proceed to treat "the authors" (or "the researchers" or "the experimenters") as a
single entity, except where otherwise noted.
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ten central chapters of the book in which they report their findings
fulfill this goal with the objectivity one expects from leading social
scientists. Yet at many points in their presentation, the data do not
support their critical view of punitive damages juries as strongly as
they would have readers believe. 5
Any study that sets out to determine whether decision-making
processes or outcomes are flawed necessarily employs one or more
criteria or norms of sound judgment.6  The authors of Punitive
Damages use four types of criteria to evaluate jurors' and juries'
punitive damages judgments. They variously compare participants'
reasoning and decisions to (1) what a judge would have decided (what
may be called the "judicial" norm); (2) what the relevant legal rules
appear to require (the "legal" norm); (3) the outcome dictated by the
consequentialist theory of optimal deterrence (the "economic"
norm)7; and (4) the standards of rational decision-making commonly
employed in cognitive and social psychological research (the "rational
judgment" norm).8 So, for instance, in arguing that jurors and juries
vote for punitives more often than they should, the authors use the
judicial and legal norms9 (chapter 5) as well as the economic norm
5. It may very well be the case, as Phoebe Ellsworth has written, that "[a]lmost every
author [of an empirical study] exaggerates the significance of the problem studied, overstates
the implications of the results, or both." Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Sticks and Stones, 23 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 719, 720 (1999). Even if this were the only criticism to be made of PUNITIVE
DAMAGES, it would still be worth informing readers as precisely as possible of discrepancies
between data and interpretation. As I will argue, however, the authors do more than overstate
the importance or implications of their findings; in a number of instances they make disputable
claims for their results seemingly for the purpose of constructing a slanted picture of jury
behavior in punitive damages cases.
6. See MacCoun, supra note 3, at 264-65 (referring to "logics" used to determine bias or
error).
7. The idea underlying optimal deterrence is that society benefits when it properly
balances productive (yet necessarily risky) activity and safety, and benefits most when it spends
resources to deter the harmful consequences of risky activity only up to the point at which
precautions (including productive activity curtailed) cost as much as the gains in safety that the
precautions achieve. Thus, "the task of the legal system [should be] to create penalties that are
high enough to produce adequate deterrence [of risky activity], but not so high as to produce
overdeterrence" (pp. 109-10).
8. The "rational judgment" norm may be easier to define negatively than positively. It
encompasses the ability to make decisions while avoiding framing effects, availability and
hindsight biases, the "fundamental attribution error," and other habits of perception and
judgment that social scientists would consider errors if present in their own collections, analyses,
or reports of data. For a critical discussion of this norm, see David C. Funder, Errors and
Mistakes: Evaluating the Accuracy of Social Judgment, 101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 75 (1987).
9. In some circumstances the judicial and legal norms may be conflated, namely, if it is
assumed that judges follow the relevant law. Nevertheless, the two norms remain analytically
distinct: the judicial norm entails a comparison across decision-makers (e.g., jurors' versus
judges' verdict preferences), while the legal norm, like the norms of optimal deterrence and
rational judgment, entails a comparison of the target decision to an extrinsic standard or
[Vol 78:239
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(chapter 10). In characterizing punitive damages awards as arbitrary
or irrational, they tend to emphasize the rational judgment norm,
although the other norms play important roles here, too. 0
When the authors (or any researchers) evaluate their findings in
light of their criteria-for instance, when they identify a discrepancy
between juror performance and norm as "bias" or "error"-we
should ask at least the following (interrelated) questions: First, have
the researchers indeed identified a discrepancy? That is, are the
results pointing to the discrepancy significant, reliable, and valid?
Second, what should be made of the discrepancy? That is, does it
really indicate a shortcoming in the decision-maker's thinking or
decisions, or is there some other explanation for the discrepancy?
And if there is bias or error, how important is it as a practical or
theoretical matter?" Third, have the researchers adequately justified
their choice and implementation of the particular criterion as the
basis for a normative evaluation of the decision-maker's performance
in this context?
Punitive Damages fares very well with regard to the first ques-
tion. When the authors claim to have identified a discrepancy be-
tween juror or jury performance and a clearly specified normative
criterion, the discrepancy seems real. What the authors make of
these discrepancies, however (the second question), is occasionally
problematic. Many of their accounts of what they have found are
entirely convincing (as I will observe throughout this Review). But in
various ways, generally small in themselves but cumulatively hard to
ignore-sometimes in the design of the experiments, more frequently
in the language employed to characterize their findings and in the
selective use (or, more often, neglect) of other empirical data to
provide a context for their findings-the authors' normative position
leads them to present their results tendentiously. I will suggest
alternative interpretations of the findings of several of the studies.
Among other things, I will indicate where readers' appreciation of the
criterion. See MacCoun, supra note 3, at 264-65. Of course, jurors' and judges' decisions may
be compared both to each other and to an extrinsic criterion, as the authors do in the research
reported in chapter 11 (evaluating the judgments of both jury-eligible participants and real
judges in light of the rational judgment norm and other criteria).
10. It is more difficult to pin down the standard on which their crucial description of
punitive damages awards as highly variable and unpredictable is based, and there really is no
reliable criterion for judging that punitive awards are excessive. I will return to both points later
in this Review.
11. See Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision
Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723 (1999).
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authors' research could be furthered by additional context in the form
of empirical data about real world punitive damages (which would
provide a better estimate of the scope of the "problem") and more
detailed information about the experimental scenarios used as
stimulus materials (which might allow readers to identify reasons for
participants' conduct that do not fit as neatly into the authors' argu-
ment).
This brings us to the third question. The criteria against which
the authors measure juries' punitive damages judgments-norms of
good decision-making supplied by judicial outcomes, legal rules,
social scientific rationality, and economic theory-are all (with the
possible exception of the last) widely employed in jury research.
Each can be appropriate; each also has its limitations. For instance,
judges can disagree with one another and legal rules can sometimes
be reasonably interpreted in conflicting ways, undermining the
reliability of the judicial and legal norms, respectively. Moreover,
because juries may legitimately bring to the justice system values that
judges may not adequately express, and because those different
values may sometimes lead juries to decide cases differently than
judges would, it would be odd to rely too heavily on the judicial norm
(or the legal norm as construed by judges) to evaluate juries' deci-
sions.12
Of greater concern is the norm that is most critical to the book.
The authors' conception of how big a problem juries' punitive dam-
ages awards pose, and thus how badly needed are reforms that shift
authority for making the punitive damages decision away from juries,
is ultimately grounded in a notion of punitive damages based on the
goal of optimal deterrence, and the high levels of consistency and
predictability in outcomes that efficient deterrence demands. Of
course consistency and predictability are virtues in a legal system, and
optimal deterrence is a worthwhile objective, all things being equal.
12. As for the rational judgment norm, it could be argued that it is based on an impover-
ished notion of how humans think and act. Many narrative theorists and cultural anthropolo-
gists, for instance, would contend that human judgment can be properly understood and
evaluated only against the background of deep, pervasive cultural patterns and influences that
are difficult if not impossible to operationalize in an experimental context. It has also been
argued that departures from the rational judgment norm as measured in the laboratory are
sometimes not judgmental flaws, and may even be strengths, when evaluated in terms of
broader, real world performance standards, or plausible, alternative normative conceptions of
social judgment. See Funder, supra note 8; Philip E. Tetlock, Social Functionalist Frameworks
for Judgment and Choice: Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors, 109 PSYCHOL.
REV. 451 (2002). Neither of these observations, however, poses serious difficulties for the
authors' use of the rational judgment norm in the research reported in the book.
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The authors' focus is troubling, however, because it completely
ignores another, undeniably important goal that punitive damages
should serve, one more closely allied to corrective justice than to
deterrence-retribution for wrongs perceived to be reprehensible. I
•.1ill con,..ude the Review by discussing whether the authors have
adequately explained and justified the normative vision of punitive
damages that underlies much of their research program and provides
the standards for their most severe criticisms of jury behavior.
I. ARE JURORS TOO INCLINED TO AWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES?
Two distinct experiments lead the authors to conclude that jurors
and juries award punitive damages more frequently than they should.
In one (chapter 5), mock juries were presented with stimulus materi-
als based on four actual cases in which courts ultimately ruled that
punitives should not be awarded. Across all cases, 58% of the mock
juries voted to award punitives; excluding hung verdicts, 67% voted
for punitives. In the second (chapter 10, experiment 1), individual
participants read one of four versions of an airplane defect story; in
all versions the cost of the repair exceeded the expected accident
costs, and so the defendant airline should not even have been found
negligent (under the standard cost-benefit definition of reasonable
care 3), much less reckless and thus possibly liable for punitives. In
this experiment, 84% of participants voted to award punitives. Thus,
using two different benchmarks for gauging the appropriateness of
punitives-in the first experiment, the judicial norm as indicated by
the actual final decisions of trial or appellate courts; in the second, the
economic norm as reflected in a correct alignment of perceived
culpability and cost-benefit analysis-a majority of participants can
be said to have "got it wrong" when they decided to award punitives.
The authors of the first study (Hastie, Schkade, and Payne) write that
"the number of juries that rendered verdicts discrepant from those
reached on appeal is perhaps disturbing" (p. 84).
These authors are careful to disclaim reliance on the courts' reso-
lutions as a test of the correctness of their juries' decisions: "[O]ne
13. Often attributed to Learned Hand's opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), in which a cost-benefit calculus was used to define negligence: where B
equals the burden or cost of taking precautions, P equals the probability that an accident will
occur if the precautions are not taken, and L equals the severity of the loss should the accident
occur, an injurer is negligent if it failed to take those precautions where B < P x L. See also infra
note 68 (discussing cost side of cost-benefit equation).
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could argue that the higher courts were wrong, and punitive damages
were warranted in those cases. Our focus, however, is not so much on
the right or wrong of the decision as it is on the extent to which juror
reasoning considered the necessary conditions for the verdicts ren-
dered" (p. 80). While the latter set of findings may indeed be the
"central" ones produced by the study14 and will be taken up later in
this Review, the authors do seem to intend that readers infer from the
discrepancies between experimental and actual outcomes that the
mock juries that voted for punitives erred. They write that they chose
the four cases "because they are frequently cited as precedents, and
because the proper action on the issue of punitive damages had been
decided as a matter of law by trial or appellate court review of the
original proceedings" (p. 80) (emphasis added), implying that the
actual cases create a reliable benchmark after all. More directly, they
write that "discussion of issues that were legally relevant reduced the
tendency to decide, incorrectly, that punitive damages were war-
ranted" (p. 90) (emphasis added).
Yet the design of this experiment is arguably biased toward pro-
ducing the impression that jurors tend to award punitives when judges
would not. 5 First, while the authors admit that one or more of the
appellate courts in the actual cases may have gotten it wrong when
they ruled that punitives were inappropriate as a matter of law, they
do not make it clear, as they might easily have done, that in two of the
four cases the trial judges firmly believed that punitives were appro-
priate, and the appellate courts went to some length to explain why
they thought punitives should not have been allowed. This at least
suggests that the ultimate outcomes in the actual cases may not be as
reliable a criterion of the incorrectness of awarding punitives as the
authors imply.,6
This suggestion may be underscored by considering one of the
stimulus cases, which the authors helpfully reproduce (pp. 93-95).
(Indeed, only here and in chapter 9 do the authors provide this kind
of detail about their experimental materials.) I encourage the reader
14. Reid Hastie et al., Reply to Vidmar, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 715, 715 (1999).
15. The original publication of this study prompted an adversarial forum in LAW AND
HUMAN BEHAVIOR in which Neil Vidmar criticized the study, its authors (Hastie, Schkade, and
Payne) responded, and other prominent jury researchers (Phoebe Ellsworth and Robert
MacCoun) weighed in. Ellsworth, supra note 5; Hastie et al., supra note 14 MacCoun, supra
note 11; Vidmar, supra note 1. To their credit, the authors refer readers to this forum (p. 223
n.17). Two of the major criticisms in this portion of the Review are taken from Vidmar's paper.
16. Vidmar, supra note 1, at 707-10.
[Vol 78:239
CAN TORT JURIES PUNISH COMPETENTLY
to attempt the task assigned to the participants in the experiment: to
read this scenario and then, applying the judge's instructions on
punitives (reproduced in Appendix A, pp. 259-60), decide whether
punitives should be awarded. When I do so, it strikes me that it
would at least be reasonable to conclude that all four elements of the
legal definition of "recklessness" are satisfied, in which case, punitives
could reasonably be awarded-and the appellate court's determina-
tion that punitives were inappropriate as a matter of law would be not
merely disputable, but incorrect.7
In addition, by choosing as their stimulus materials four cases in
which the "correct" decision was not to award punitives, the re-
searchers allowed experimental participants to differ from the norm
in only one direction-by voting for punitives when they should not
have. This is the result that happens to coincide with the depiction of
punitive damages jurors as antidefendant (p. 233) and anticorporate
(pp. 113-14) presented elsewhere in the book. Had the researchers
included scenarios in which the "correct" decision was to award
punitives, then discrepancies between participant and actual out-
comes might (also) have indicated that juries are generally incompe-
tent to decide punitives,8 or perhaps that they display biases against
as well as in favor of punitives.9 Since these patterns could not
emerge from the experiment as designed, it can be argued that the
study was biased toward the outcome indicated by other experiments
reported in the book.
The author of the second experiment (Viscusi) purporting to
show that jurors are too inclined to vote for punitives interprets his
results-84% of participants awarded punitives when, according to
the economic criterion of good decision-making, none should have-
essentially as follows: The defendant airline declined to fix a cargo
door on one of its planes at a cost of $2,000. Because reliable esti-
mates placed the risk of harm at 1 in 10 (in other versions of the
17. Of course, the scenario given to the participants differed in many respects (even if not
in the "core facts" represented) from the evidence before the trial court and the body of
information contained in the record on appeal, so I cannot confidently say whether I would
agree with the actual trial or appellate court's decisions. But this simply reinforces the basic
criticism of the experimental design, or at least the significance the authors draw from it.
18. Ellsworth, supra note 5, at 721.
19. Vidmar, supra note 1, at 710-11. Note that a majority of participants seem to have
voted not to award punitives in several of the scenarios used in the experiments reported in
chapters 2 (p. 38 tbl. 2.2) and 3 (p. 55 tbl. 3.5), which might temper the view of trigger-happy
punitive juries presented in chapter 5. (In the absence of more detailed accounts of those
scenarios, however, it is impossible to go beyond this rather superficial speculation.)
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scenario, 1 in 1,000, 1 in 100,000, or 1 in 1,000,000, respectively) and
the loss in case of accident at $15,000 in property (or $1.5 million
property loss, $150 million personal injury loss (29 deaths), $1.5
billion (290 deaths), respectively), the cost of taking precautions
($2,000) exceeded the expected benefit (in accident avoidance) those
precautions would yield ($1,500). (In Learned Hand terms, B > P x
L.) So the defendant did not act carelessly in not fixing the cargo
door. If the defendant was not negligent, then the defendant cannot
possibly have been reckless, because recklessness reflects a greater
degree of culpability or blameworthiness than mere negligence. Since
the defendant must be found reckless for punitives to be awarded,
punitives should not have been awarded. So 84% of the mock jurors
"got it wrong." This and other studies reported in the same chapter
highlight jurors' "[f]ailure to think sensibly about risk and risk-cost
trade-off issues," and more broadly show that "jurors particularly fall
short of reasonable standards of behavior" (p. 185).
That jurors are not very good risk managers is one of the sturdi-
est conclusions to be drawn from Viscusi's (and others') research (as
will be discussed in greater detail later in this Review). If everyone
agreed that competent risk management-optimal deterrence-were
the sole (or even a necessary) criterion for evaluating jury decision-
making, the upshot of this research would be obvious: jurors often do
get it wrong (and something should be done about it). The problem
is, as Robert MacCoun asks: "If we had an external criterion for
judging correct verdicts, why wouldn't we just use it to resolve the
case?" 0 The law does not simply adopt the economic (or, for that
matter, the judicial) norm of decision-making, and one important
reason why it does not is that the power to decide lawsuits is not
confined to experts, whether judges or economists; the legal system
makes room for lay decision-makers-jurors-and hence whatever
substantive values those jurors may properly bring to bear on their
judgments.
A discrepancy between jurors' punitive damage decisions and
those dictated by cost-benefit analysis, therefore, may indicate not
juror "error" but rather a difference between jurors' relevant values
and those of risk analysis experts. For example, jurors may place
greater weight on potential accident victims' security (as against
potential injurers' liberty to engage in useful but necessarily risky
20. MacCoun, supra note 11, at 726.
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activity) than the optimal deterrence standard does. 21 Jurors may
plausibly believe that so long as an accident is reasonably foreseeable,
the defendant should be liable if it fails to do everything reasonably
practicable to avoid it-that is, that the defendant should be consid-
ered negligent unless the burden of precaution was disproportionate
to the risk, not merely slightly greater than the risk.22 In that event, it
is not at all clear that participants should not have found (had they
been asked) that the defendant in the experimental scenario was
negligent, since the precautions ($2,000) cost about the same as the
expected accident costs ($1,500), and could easily have been under-
taken. And if the defendant was sufficiently blameworthy to be
considered negligent, it may be less obvious that the defendant should
not be judged to have acted recklessly, warranting punitive sanctions.
The data also indicate that the largest increment in the frequency
of punitives occurred between the versions of the scenario in which
only property was lost (74% to 78% voting for punitives) and those in
which 29 or 290 people were killed (95% to 96% voting for puni-
tives), reflecting the high (if not always economically justifiable) value
jurors tend to place on risks to life. Moreover, in a group of about 90
judges who responded to the same accident scenarios (chapter 11,
experiment 2), about 30% voted to award punitives, including 69% in
the case in which 290 people died as a result of the defendant's failure
to fix the cargo door. Thus, even though they "exercise[d] more
restraint" than jurors did (pp. 196-97), nearly a third of the sample of
sitting judges also violated basic economic efficiency principles in
deciding to award punitives. This would be really remarkable if the
standard for the correct outcomes in these cases were as obvious as
the author seems to think it is. An alternative inference to be drawn
from the widespread neglect of optimal deterrence by these judges is
that something other than optimal deterrence may (sometimes)
properly drive punitive damages awards. This is not to say that most
or even many of the jury-eligible participants who voted for punitives
in this experiment were in fact justified in doing so. My only point is
21. On liberty vs. security in tort law, see Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995). For an argument that negligence law is properly guided
by a norm of reasonableness that is not grounded in economic rationality, see Gregory C.
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996).
22. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that
Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114 (2001). According to my colleague
Steve Gilles, this is also an important conception of negligence in modem English tort law,
although the precedents are far from clear. Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit
Balancing in English Negligence Law, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 489 (2002).
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that while the authors' findings reliably identify important patterns in
juror and jury decision-making, we need not join the authors in
interpreting those findings as showing that jurors award punitives too
often.
How often do real juries award punitives? The data vary by loca-
tion and over time.23  One comprehensive and widely respected
study24 of civil verdicts in 74 counties around the country for the
period 1988-90 shows that punitives were awarded in 8.3% of verdicts
that plaintiffs won and 4.5% of all civil cases tried to a verdict.
Punitives were awarded in 8.6% of products liability cases that
plaintiffs won and 2.5% of medical malpractice cases that plaintiffs
won; in general, punitives were awarded at a much higher rate in
cases involving financial harm than in those involving physical harm.
Another study, by the RAND Institute for Civil Justice, 25 shows that
in four geographically diverse counties between 1985 and 1994,
punitive damages were awarded in 2% to 7% of civil cases tried to a
verdict, with by far the greatest percentages of all punitive awards by
case type coming in business cases (47%) and intentional tort cases
(36%); product liability and medical malpractice cases each ac-
counted for less than 5% of all punitive awards. These and other
empirical data do not tell us, of course, whether real juries' punitive
damages awards are too frequent, not frequent enough, or just right;
but they do help to put the authors' experimental findings in con-
text.26
The real world data also suggest another limitation of the au-
thors' experimental program, applicable to the variability and size of
punitive damages awards as well as their frequency. Throughout the
reported research, the scenarios used as stimulus materials are
23. For recent reviews of the data, see THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN
DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 141-43 (medical malpractice cases), 181-84 (products liability cases)
(2001); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 161-63 (2002). For data in medical malpractice
cases, see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 254-55 (1995).
24. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
213-21 (1995).
25. ERIK MOLLER. TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985 33-35 (1996).
26. In the introduction, George Priest observes with regard to similar data that "[t]he claim
that [punitive damages] verdicts.., are relatively infrequent must surely be true given the
hundreds of thousands of civil claims filed and litigated each year in the United States" (p. 2).
First, the data mentioned in the text measure punitives as a percentage of cases tried to verdict,
not cases "filed and litigated," which makes the single-digit percentages more telling. Second,
neither Priest nor any of the book's authors follow up by trying to relate their experimental
findings to the verdict data in any way.
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exclusively personal injury and environmental tort cases; the authors
did not try to ascertain jurors' punitive responses to business and
other intentional torts, which account for the greatest number of
actual punitive awards. Obviously the authors cannot study every-
thing about punitive damages, and by confining their research as they
did, they not only economized on the creation of their materials but
also allowed themselves to compare certain data across experiments.
Still, their results leave open the possibility that jurors' punitive
damages decisions may reflect case type effects: that is, that awards in
business tort cases, for instance, may differ systematically in fre-
quency, variability, or size (or in other ways) from those in product
liability and/or environmental tort cases. This would be an interesting
topic for further research. In addition, by emphasizing atypical
punitive damages cases such as those involving product liability, the
authors have made the goal of optimal deterrence seem more plausi-
ble and compelling than it might be in most actual cases, in which
punitives (if any) are grounded in the defendant's intentional wrong-
doing and cost-benefit analysis does not come into play.27 The
authors also (no doubt unintentionally) may have helped their
findings conform to general readers' expectations, based on media-
driven prototypes, that personal injury juries are especially inclined to
award excessive damages, including punitive damages.28
II. How BIG A PROBLEM IS THE VARIABILITY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS?
The unpredictability of punitive damages awards is perhaps the
authors' major concern. The current system asks that lay decision-
makers translate their (largely shared) moral feelings of outrage at a
defendant's conduct into a precise dollar figure on an unbounded
scale without any meaningful guidance. "Jurors are told nothing
about typical awards in comparable cases, and they are given no help
on the complex question of how to infer the punitive impact or
deterrent efficacy of a dollar sanction" (p. 213). They are up a creek
without a paddle, or, in the authors' formulation, doing "magnitude
27. 1 thank Tony Sebok for pointing this out to me.
28. See, e.g., Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the
Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996); see also infra pp. 257-58 (discussing Priest's introduction); William
Haltom & Michael W. McCann, Law and Lore: Urban Legends and the Politics of Tort Reform
(1999) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
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scaling without a modulus" (p. 41). The result: awards that are
"distinctively unpredictable" (p. 212), "highly erratic" (p. 37), and
"arbitrary" (p. 248), displaying "inconsistency and randomness" (p.
242). It is this inconsistency and unpredictability that the authors find
most threatening to the rule of law (p. 248), and the need to contain it
is ostensibly the strongest motivation behind their policy recommen-
dations.
Two experiments (chapters 2 and 3) yield much of the data on
which the authors rely for their finding that punitive damages awards
are too variable for the good of the legal system. In the chapter 2
study, each participant read 10 accident scenarios, 29 rated the outra-
geousness of the defendant's behavior (on a 0-6 scale), judged how
much the defendant should be punished (same scale), and assessed a
punitive award in dollars (no limit). The researchers found a remark-
able degree of agreement among participants' levels of outrage at and
intent to punish the defendants in the various scenarios. Individuals'
rankings of the scenarios in terms of intent to punish correlated "in
the .50 to .60 range" (p. 35). And when individual responses were
aggregated by demographic groups, the correlations between the
mean responses of different groups' rankings of the cases were .99.30
So jurors' moral intuitions, their outrage and intent-to-punish judg-
ments, seem to be widely shared and highly consistent.
29. Each of the 10 scenarios was presented in 2 or more conditions: in all 10, the size of the
defendant firm (large vs. small) was manipulated, and in 4 of the 10, the severity of harm (high
vs. low) was also manipulated, yielding 28 versions of the scenarios in all. The manipulations
are not relevant to my discussion here.
30. As the authors point out, the .99 correlation indicates that "[j]udgments of intent to
punish in these scenarios of personal injury cases evidently rest on a bedrock of moral intuitions
that are broadly shared in society" (p. 35). But that the mean rankings by groups of respon-
dents should correlate at .99, given the .5-.6 correlations among individuals, may not be that
surprising. Given that demographic variables predict only 5% to 15% of the variance in verdict
preferences generally (see infra note 34), grouping respondents by demographic category is
likely to be nearly a random grouping for the present purposes as well, and the larger the
(randomly chosen) groups, the higher the expected correlation between group means. What
may be more striking are the .5-.6 correlations among individuals' intent-to-punish rankings.
Given a set of 10 various fact situations, ranging from air bag deployments to drugs with side
effects to workplace toxic harms to inadequate security leading to a parking lot assault, for
which punitive damages are arguably appropriate (and thus the defendants in all have behaved
with some degree of culpability), these correlations between rankings seem quite high. They are
much higher, for instance, than what I have found when I have asked my torts students to rank
eight intentional infliction of emotional distress cases from their casebook in order of outra-
geousness. Of course, we can not determine whether we ought to be surprised at this degree of
agreement without knowing more about the stimulus cases; unfortunately, the authors tell us
nothing at all about them in this chapter, and provide only one-sentence blurbs about them (and
five other cases) in chapter 3 (p. 47 tbl. 3.1). This is another instance in which the authors, by
providing more context about their experimental data, could have allowed readers to evaluate
the reported findings more thoroughly.
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To determine whether dollar awards, by contrast, would be "er-
ratic," the researchers created "synthetic juries" by randomly sam-
pling groups of 12 individual responses on all 3 dependent measures
(outrage, intent to punish, dollar award) for all stimulus cases and
computing the medians to create the synthetic jury's judgments; they
did the same for another group of 12 individual responses and then
compared the median judgments.31 With regard to outrage and intent
to punish, the median correlations between pairs of synthetic juries
were in the .86-.89 range. In contrast, the median correlation be-
tween pairs of dollar awards was .42.32 The authors characterize this
level of agreement as "quite weak" (p. 39), producing "severe unpre-
dictability and highly erratic outcomes" (p. 37).
As the authors recognize, a key to the much greater variability of
dollar awards is that outrage and intent-to-punish were measured on
bounded, labeled scales (e.g., a minimum response of 0 = "not at all
outrageous," and a maximum of 6 = "absolutely outrageous" (p. 34)),
whereas dollar awards were measured on an unbounded scale. No
particular dollar amount reliably represents "absolutely outrageous"
or any other relevant label. This is precisely what the authors mean
by "magnitude scaling without a modulus" (p. 41).
But let us look more closely at that .42 correlation between pairs
of synthetic juries' dollar awards. The .42 is presumably a value for r,
the usual correlation statistic.3  Is an r of .42 "quite weak"? It is
31. More specifically, the researchers randomly sampled groups of 12 individual responses
to each dependent measure (outrage, intent to punish, and dollar award) and computed the
median judgment of that group, a "synthetic jury," on that measure, for each of the 28 cases.
They then randomly selected a different 12-person synthetic jury and computed its median
response for each case. Then they correlated the 2 sets of 28 medians to determine how erratic
(or consistent) the two juries are in evaluating the 28 cases. To enhance the reliability of their
analyses, the researchers created 60 synthetic juries and computed the correlations between
every possible pair both within measures (e.g., between two sets of 28 dollar awards) and
between measures (e.g., between a set of 28 dollar awards and a set of 28 intent-to-punish
ratings).
32. Outrage medians correlated with dollar award medians at .47; intent to punish medians
correlated with dollar award medians at .51.
33. What the researchers are actually measuring here is intercoder reliability-the level of
agreement between independent judges' decisions (I thank Dan Bailis for pointing this out to
me; cf. p. 91, where the authors explicitly use r as a measure of intercoder reliability of research
assistants' independent judgments of whether participants' responses indicated a correct
understanding of jury instructions). Unfortunately the authors of chapter 2 do not identify the
statistic they are using (and in general do not report their results in standard APA format, which
would facilitate the understanding and critique of their results). Where applicable, a better
statistic for reporting intercoder reliability would be kappa, which measures not just the level of
agreement between judges but the difference between the observed and expected levels of
agreement. Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. &
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37 (1960). It is unclear from chapter 2 whether the authors are
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certainly much less than one of nearly .9; as best I can tell from the
information the authors provide, however, it is significant at p < .05,
the conventional test for statistical significance. An r of .42 yields an
r-squared of .176, that is to say, knowing one synthetic jury's damages
awards allows us to predict 17.6% of the variance in another's. This
may not sound like much, but it is a greater predictive value than, say,
the high end of leading estimates for juror demographic variables as
predictors of their verdict preferences;34 it is about the same as the
predictive value of LSAT scores on first-year law school grades.35 In
all of these cases more than 80% of the variance in outcomes is
attributable to factors other than the predictor, including chance. But
the fact is that chance (or what looks to us, with our imperfect knowl-
edge, like chance) plays a great role in all kinds of events, indeed a
greater role than most people are accustomed to acknowledging. The
practical ceiling for the predictability of complex, unbounded judg-
ments like punitive damages awards must be far short of r = .9.
Because the authors do not clearly and persuasively identify the
standard against which the variability of their experimental juries'
awards is measured and found wanting, what they make of the degree
of variability they found is open to dispute.
Yet the variability is undeniable. Another, very extensive study
of both individual and mock jury decision-making (chapter 3; the
experiment is discussed in more detail in the next section of this
Review) revealed a "strikingly large" degree of variability in different
juries' punitive awards in response to identical cases (pp. 54-55). For
instance, the mean awards in the 5 cases that generated the highest
dollar figures ranged from $210,000 to over $83 million; the median
was $10 million, but there was a 10% chance of an award of only
comparing synthetic juries' punitive damages awards (a continuous measure) or their rankings
of cases in terms of dollar awards; if the latter, this could be converted to a categorical or
nominal scale, for which kappa could be used. This technical detail is important in this case
because, compared to kappa, a simple correlation exaggerates the difference between
participants' near consensus regarding outrage and intent-to-punish and their disagreements
regarding dollar awards. It does so precisely because the bounded scale on which outrage and
intent to punish were measured would create a much higher expected level of interjudge
agreement than would the unbounded scale on which damages were measured.
34. See, e.g., Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore:
What Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FORENSIC REPS. 233 (1990)
(reviewing empirical literature and finding overall that demographic and personality variables
account for 5% to 15% of the variance in verdict preferences).
35. LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, LSAT & LSDAS REGISTRATION AND
INFORMATION BOOK 121 (2002) (median correlation in 2000 between LSAT scores and first-
year law school grades at 183 law schools was .41, yielding r-squared of .168; adding under-
graduate GPA to the model yields median r of .50, r-squared = .25).
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$510,000 or less and a 10% chance of an award of $29 million or
more. For the middle 5 cases, awards ranged from $20,000 to $60
million, with a median of $800,000, a 10th percentile of $140,000 and a
90th percentile of $11.2 million. Plainly a few outlier awards (of the
sort that the trial or appellate court could very well reduce) distend
the range; nevertheless, the variation is considerable by any measure.
As the authors explain, the variability of punitive damages
awards would hamper a lawyer from being able to make confident
predictions about a client's likely exposure (p. 56). Consequences of
uncertainty include increases in the rates at which cases go to trial, or
"result[] in expensive settlements to avoid uncertain trials, which can
stifle innovation and produce other economic inefficiencies" (p. 214).
While these statements may be based on slightly inflated expectations
about the predictability of legal outcomes in general, as suggested
above, and may overstate the economic consequences of uncer-
tainty,36 the authors' basic findings of considerable unpredictability in
punitive damage awards are reliable and important."
Data on the variability of punitive damages awards in real cases
would have provided additional context for the authors' research. As
the authors point out, the problem with using real world data as a
measure of variability is that no two cases are identical, so that
differences in awards may be attributable to differences between
cases rather than variation in decision-makers, hence the value of the
experimental method (p. 214). Nevertheless, an analysis of real
verdicts could help suggest the extent to which the degree of unpre-
dictability observed in experiments is likely to be a real world concern
as well. In the concluding chapters, the authors address and critique
in some detail a leading study by Theodore Eisenberg and others3 8 of
actual punitive awards that found a significant degree of predictability
(pp. 214, 245-48). 39 While it is not the authors' aim to summarize all
36. One of the authors (Viscusi) has argued vigorously that punitives fail in their deterrent
function and lead to economic inefficiencies. W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998).
Responses to Viscusi's article by Theodore Eisenberg and David Luban, and Viscusi's response
to them, follow in the same issue. See supra note 2.
37. See p. 245 (discussion of external validity of experimental findings of punitive award
variability).
38. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
623 (1997).
39. The critique (as noted on p. 246 n.7) is largely taken from Viscusi, supra note 36. The
key arguments, followed by my own brief comments, are as follows: (1) Eisenberg et al.'s use of
log awards instead of dollar amounts as the dependent variable, whatever its justification in
statistical method, tends to compress the apparent variability of the awards. This point is well
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previous research, it does not seem sufficient simply to mention the
existence of competing studies on variability and then conclude that
"[o]ur reading of this controversial literature is that jury verdicts are
highly variable for similar cases, especially across jurisdictions" (p.
214). By presenting some of the data from these studies, and doing so
earlier in the book, the authors would have enabled readers to obtain
a better perspective on the validity of their experimental work.
III. ARE PUNITIVE AWARDS Too HIGH? MAKING SENSE OF THE
"SEVERITY SHIFT"
Of the three objectionable features of juries' punitive damages
awards-too frequent, too variable, too large-the authors' research
program places the least emphasis on the last. This is understandable,
because experts are no more capable than laypeople are of undertak-
ing magnitude scaling without a modulus and producing values
reliable enough to be used as benchmarks for "correct" award size. 40
So the authors would have less of a basis for criticizing participants'
awards as too high than they have when they claim that those awards
are too frequent or too variable. The one experiment that directly
addresses award size (chapter 3) compares jury awards not to an
extrinsic standard (such as the economic norm) or one based on what
judges would have decided, but to the predeliberation award prefer-
taken. (2) "Only" 17% of Eisenberg et al.'s sample consists of cases from "more volatile areas
of products liability, medical malpractice, and toxic substance liability," the kinds of cases
emphasized in PUNITIVE DAMAGES (p. 246). But these types of cases account for only a very
small percentage of all punitive awards (as the research cited supra note 28 shows); if anything,
the fact that Eisenberg et al.'s data "do not say a great deal about the sorts of cases that we have
been emphasizing in this book" (p. 246) reveals the authors' focus on the atypical, not a
shortcoming of Eisenberg et al.'s study. See also supra p. 257; supra note 38. (3) Most
importantly, Eisenberg et al.'s findings that punitive awards are significantly predictable depend
on assuming that there will be a nonzero award, which itself is a somewhat unpredictable event.
It seems to me that this argument mistakenly shifts the focus away from the predictability of
punitives over the relevant long haul. Why could not a defendant simply estimate a likelihood
for nonzero awards (based on industry averages, say) and factor that into its ex ante determina-
tion of expected liability for punitives over a given period of time? If companies can do the kind
of cost-benefit analyses that the authors elsewhere promote (and castigate juries for not
appreciating, see infra pp. 266-76), they ought to be able to come up with good enough
projections of P, and hence P x L, for punitive as well as compensatory damages.
40. One of the authors (Viscusi) describes the punitive damages award in the 1999 Chevy
Malibu case as "wildly disproportionate to the extent of the harm" (p. 112), so presumably he
has some implicit standard of proportionality (or tame disproportionality) in mind; however,
this would provide a criterion for judging proper award size only if the extent of the harm were
a sufficient basis (perhaps adjusted by some multiplier) for choosing an award. (In chapter 9,
Viscusi reports a test of jurors' compliance with punitive damages instructions that adopts
precisely that basis. See discussion infra pp. 274-76.)
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ences of that jury's members. (This is the "severity shift" experiment,
discussed later in this section of the Review.)
But it is the reputed size of punitive damages awards that attracts
the most attention in the press, 41 and the book deploys most of what
little real world context it offers (prior to Reid Hastie's summary
chapter 12) to appeal to this presumed focus of popular interest.
Consider in this regard the book's introduction, by George Priest.42
Here is how Priest begins:
Over the past two decades, our country has experienced a
dramatic increase in the incidence and magnitude of punitive dam-
ages verdicts rendered by juries in civil litigation. Perhaps the most
extraordinary example is the July 2000 award of $144.8 billion in
the Florida class action brought against cigarette manufacturers.
But there are many other examples of huge verdicts.... For exam-
ple, in July 1999 a California jury awarded a punitive damages ver-
dict of $4.8 billion, and in May of that same year an Alabama jury,
in a case in which the economic damages were alleged to equal no
more than $600, awarded a punitive damages verdict of $580
million....
The[] magnitude [of these verdicts] is remarkable. The award
in the tobacco case, for example, equals 2.4 times what our federal
government spends each year on education, 52% of the amount
spent on national defense, and a full 80% of the amount the federal
government collects annually in corporate income taxes (p. 1).
Four things about this passage should leap out at anyone accus-
tomed to reading quantitative research in social science. The first is
the argument by anecdote: extreme cases are presented as if they are
characteristic of the punitive damages process. Base rate information
about mean or median awards, the kind of central tendency data that
could at least begin to provide a more accurate picture of punitive
awards in general, is completely absent. This is a rhetorical strategy
favored by probusiness lobbyists and politicians and uncritical report-
ers, 43 not responsible social scientists.44 The second is the use of
41. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717,726-33 (1998).
42. Of course, the authors did not write this introduction; it is neither their report of their
research nor their assessment of its importance and implications. Nevertheless it does seem
reasonable to me to hold the authors somewhat responsible for Priest's remarks: they are the
first words the conscientious reader is likely to encounter, thus playing an important role in
setting the context for the authors' own words, and it is hard to imagine that the authors did not
review and approve what Priest wrote.
43. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 24, at 29-59, 205-13; Galanter, supra note 41,
at 729-33; Haltom & McCann, supra note 28.
44. Argument by anecdote is no more persuasive when offered to show the variability and
unpredictability of punitive damages awards. Priest compares the case of BMW of North
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irrelevant judgment anchors. The size of the federal education
budget quite obviously has nothing to do with whether a given
punitive damages award is too high or not. Priest's use of these
arbitrary benchmarks is somewhat ironic in light of the authors' study
(chapter 4) that critiques jurors' undue reliance on irrelevant anchors
when determining their awards.45  The third is the absence of any
information about the relevant facts of these cases, disabling the
reader from even beginning to appreciate what might have provoked
the jurors to the level of outrage that presumably inspired the awards.
The fourth is the lack of support for the claim of a "dramatic increase
in the incidence and magnitude" of punitive awards, other than the
observation (without citation to any authority) that "[t]wo decades
ago it was unusual to observe a punitive damages verdict greater than
$1 million" (p. 2).46 It is somewhat off-putting to find such slanted
rhetoric at the very beginning of a book of quantitative social science
by outstanding scholars.
Let us turn to the research. Over 3,000 jury-eligible adults
watched a videotaped case scenario and read case materials, then
rated how severely the defendant should be punished, if at all (similar
to the intent-to-punish measure used in the experiment in chapter 2
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), in which the jury awarded $4 million in punitives, to
an identical case brought against BMW by a different customer, in which the jury awarded
"roughly similar compensatory damages, but no punitive damages whatsoever, concluding that
BMW was innocent of the reprehensible behavior that justifies punitive awards" (pp. 2-3).
Without any further information about the case, it is impossible to say whether the defendant's
conduct may not have been close to the line with regard to one of the legal prerequisites for
awarding punitives, in which case it is conceivable that a jury that found all of the elements to be
satisfied would (properly) give a substantial award, while another jury that concluded that one
of the elements was not satisfied would (properly) consider itself barred from awarding any
punitives at all.
45. The federal budget comparisons are arbitrary with regard to the evaluation of jury
verdicts but not rhetorically, of course; Priest means to marshal the readers' attitudes toward
particular activities and federal expenditures on them in service of his argument. ("What? You
mean one punitive award is more than double what the government spends on education?
That's outrageous.") In this post-Enron climate, however, one might doubt the efficacy of
Priest's invocation of the amount the government collects in corporate income taxes as a
benchmark.
46. Priest does acknowledge that "[m]any scholars and policy makers have emphasized the
relative infrequency of punitive damage verdicts across the wide range of civil litigation" (p. 2),
citing to one leading scholar (Michael Rustad) whose research supports this position. But
rather than engage in or at least summarize the bases for the controversy on this question, he
moves on to the "more general concern,.., the inability to explain these various punitive
damages verdicts on a rational basis" (p. 2). The (lack of) rationality of punitive damage
verdicts is indeed an important concern, as chapters 5 and 6 (and the next section of this
Review) indicate. My point here is only to show how the opening passages of the book's
introduction regarding the size (if not also the frequency) of punitive awards are tendentious
and misleading.
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discussed earlier, but on a 0-8 scale), or determined a punitive
damages award. Then participants met in over 500 mock juries of 6
persons and deliberated until they agreed on a punishment rating or
punitive damages award, respectively. The process was then repeated
for the other dependent measure (e.g., if asked to rate severity of
punishment first, participants then decided damages, first individually
and then in groups after deliberation). The experimenters found that
deliberation tended to polarize punishment ratings in the original
direction, i.e., high-punishment cases yielded higher punishment
ratings from juries than the mean of individuals' predeliberation
ratings for those cases; deliberation reduced the ratings of low-
punishment cases below the mean of the predeliberation ratings.
Deliberations shifted damages awards, however, in only one direc-
tion-up. Eighty-three percent of nonzero dollar verdicts by juries
were above the median individual award by that jury's members; 27%
were as high or higher than the highest predeliberation award by the
individual jurors. This is what the authors call the "severity shift." It
appears to be statistically significant47 and it is a striking confirmation
and extension of similar results in other studies.4 8
What accounts for the severity shift? The authors offer several
explanations, all of which make sense. One is that the results com-
port with the widely recognized phenomenon of "group polarization"
(p. 57), the tendency of groups to adopt a more extreme position in
the same direction after deliberating than the group's initial, prede-
liberation tendency. This is due in part to group members' suscepti-
bility to "social influences" (p. 58): members of small groups are
generally reluctant to express views too dissimilar from those ex-
pressed by others. (This is an instance of what social psychologists
call "social proof.' '49) In almost all of the experimental juries that
eventually awarded punitives, a majority of the individual members
favored punitives before deliberating (p. 49); therefore, these juries'
deliberations most likely featured a preponderance of propunitive
arguments. These arguments, especially if they expressed very strong
disapproval of the defendant's conduct, probably encouraged those
47. The authors do not report measures of significance.
48. See, e.g., Shari S. Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC'y REV. 513, 555 & n.56
(1992) (cited by the authors at p. 215 & n.4).
49. See, e.g., ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 114-
66 (rev. ed. 1993).
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jurors (if any) in the antipunitives minority before deliberations to go
along, increasing support for a higher award.
A second explanation is artifactual. The authors measured the
severity shift by determining whether the jury's award exceeded the
median of members' predeliberation judgments. 0 Because dollar
awards tend to be skewed right-there is no upper limit-the mean of
the individual awards would tend to exceed the median. So even if
the juries' awards were equal to the means of their respective mem-
bers' awards (the reasonable assumption underlying the "synthetic
jury" method described earlier), there would still be some upward
shift from predeliberation individual to (postdeliberation) jury
awards. As the authors correctly point out, however, this alone would
not account for the roughly one-quarter of jury verdicts at or above
the highest individual awards of that jury's members (pp. 59-60).
The authors' most venturesome explanation for the severity shift
is that there is a "rhetorical asymmetry" (p. 58) in deliberations that
favors those who support larger awards. "[T]hose who argue that
'more' money is necessary to punish a corporation appear to have an
upper hand. The unbounded dollar scale affords great latitude in the
expression of what 'more' means" (p. 58). This seems plausible,
although it is difficult to pursue the explanation very far without an
account of what the participants actually said during deliberations
(i.e., a content analysis of the kind provided for the study in chapter 5,
discussed later in this Review). In part this "rhetorical" advantage
would seem to recapitulate the purely statistical point just made: all
things being equal, arguments associated with the higher dollar
figures in a right-skewed distribution would exert more "pull" on the
final judgment.
The authors set forth the severity shift without stating or even
suggesting that it reflects a flaw in the punitive damages award
process. By the same token, they do not offer any explanation that
might tend to justify the shift. And yet such an explanation is possi-
ble. Of the juries that ultimately voted to award punitives, each juror
in the predeliberation majority presumably entered the deliberations
with one or more arguments that had convinced that juror that
50. The authors ranked the six individual jurors' predeliberation judgments from lowest to
highest and then inserted the jury's award into that series (now seven awards). If the jury's
award was equal to the mean of the individuals' awards, then it would be the fourth highest out
of the set of seven (six individual awards plus the jury award). The difference between this
expected rank of the jury's verdict and the observed rank, as a percentage of the maximum
possible shift, is what they labeled the "deliberation-shift measure."
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punitives were warranted. (Those jurors whose individual, predelib-
eration judgment was against punitives may also have thought of such
arguments, but found them to be outweighed by others.) During
deliberations, it is fair to assume, all of these propunitives arguments
(and perhaps more) were raised. Thus, it is likely that many jurors
heard during deliberations arguments for awarding punitives that had
not occurred to them beforehand. Some they may have considered
not especially weighty, or even redundant. But it seems fair to
assume that at least some of those new arguments carried weight and
helped persuade those jurors that punitive damages were even more
deserved than they had initially thought, and therefore, that the
punitive award ought to be higher. This is exactly the kind of rea-
soned discussion that is supposed to occur during deliberations.51 By
omitting what seems to me to be this rather obvious (if necessarily
hypothetical, in the absence of a content analysis of the deliberations)
account for the severity shift phenomenon, the authors pass up an
opportunity to make at least this aspect of juries' thinking about
punitive damages seem reasonable and justifiable.
The same experiment also showed that deliberations exacerbated
the variability and unpredictability of awards. The 10th percentile
awards by juries were a smaller fraction of the median awards than
were the 10th percentile awards by "statistical juries" (based on the
means of six individual jurors' awards taken at random); the 90th
percentile awards by mock juries were a greater multiple of the
median awards than were the 90th percentile awards by statistical
juries. Some, but not all, of the increased variability is due to the
increased size of the awards given by deliberating juries (p. 57) (i.e.,
all things being equal, the larger the median award, the more room
there is for the distribution to spread out). This finding that delibera-
tions increase the unpredictability of punitive damage awards bolsters
the implications the authors want to draw from the results of the
experiments discussed previously, because those results were based
on the judgments of individual participants, whereas the decisions of
51. Cf. Diamond & Casper, supra note 48, at 555-56 (explaining inflation of jury award
over mean of individual predeliberation awards by pointing out that jurors' exposure during
deliberations to other jurors' views of the blameworthiness of the defendant's behavior may
have led group as a whole to consider the defendant's misconduct to be more serious, leading in
turn to higher damages). My colleague Steve Gilles points out that thorough, reasoned
deliberations should also result in some jurors being persuaded by reasons against awarding
punitives. This is true, but it seems fair to assume that if the predeliberation majority of jurors
are inclined to award punitives, arguments in favor of punitives would predominate. Again, a
systematic content analysis of the deliberations could test these and other hypotheses.
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deliberating mock juries are likely (again, all things being equal) to
have greater external validity. 2
IV. Do JURIES DECIDE PUNITIVE DAMAGES IRRATIONALLY?
Throughout the present research, we have been impressed by the
serious and energetic manner in which citizens performed the diffi-
cult legal judgment tasks that are demanded by the punitive dam-
ages decision. The many systematic patterns of behavior we have
observed are convincing evidence of the jurors' conscientiousness.
Nonetheless, the legally required decision tasks often seemed to
exceed their individual and social capacities. The decision task is
not well defined by the jury instructions[, and] jurors are not pro-
vided with the necessary background information or experiences to
make reliable judgments.... (p. 241).11
So how do jurors respond in these trying circumstances? Study-
ing the processes by which jurors and juries reach punitive damages
judgments is at least as important to the authors as examining the
pattern of judgments themselves (see, e.g., pp. 2, 80). More than half
of the experiments reported in the book lend support in one form or
another to the general proposition that juries' punitive damages
awards are flawed in relation to the norm of rational judgment (as
well as the other norms they employ). Jurors tend to downplay or
ignore factors that ought to influence their decisions (such as the jury
instructions and whether the defendant's failure to take precautions
was cost-justified), to take into account factors they ought to ignore
(such as the plaintiff's lawyer's requested dollar figure), and to fall
prey to systematic cognitive biases (such as the hindsight effect and
the overestimation of low-probability risks). All of these decision-
making habits tend to lead to larger, more frequent, and more unpre-
dictable awards than more rational judgment processes would yield.
Some of the reported findings are relatively unsurprising but still
useful confirmations of phenomena frequently noted in the cognitive
and social psychological literature. I will discuss these briefly first.
Then I will turn to the several chapters (7-11) the book devotes to
establishing that jurors perform poorly as risk managers. I will
conclude by returning to the study (chapter 5) showing that jurors
tend to ignore instructions in deciding whether punitives are proper.
52. Note, however, that by concluding that "shared moral judgments do not produce
predictable dollar awards" (p. 61), the authors imply that predictability is either present or
absent, as opposed to being a matter of degree-a slightly leading interpretation of the data
that, once again, seeks to reinforce the authors' overall picture of juries' punitive awards.
53. See also pp. 26, 79, 212 (where Hastie makes similar assertions).
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V. Do JURORS DISPLAY COGNITIVE BIASES IN THINKING ABOUT
PUNITIVES?
The study reported in chapter 4 offers convincing evidence that
jurors' punitive damages awards are prone to being influenced by a
salient but legally irrelevant anchor, the dollar figure for which the
plaintiff's lawyer asks (the punitive ad damnum). Jurors saw a
videotaped narration and read a written summary of an environ-
mental accident case, and were told that the defendant had already
paid $24.5 million in compensatory damages; they were also told that
the defendant's actions had already been found to be reckless, so that
some punitives were permitted. In some conditions, the plaintiff's
lawyer requested a punitive award of "between $15 million and about
half a year's profit, $50 million" (low anchor); in others, the lawyer
requested "between $50 million and about a year's profit, $150
million" (high anchor) (pp. 65-66). The results were that, in the low-
anchor condition, jurors' median award was $15 million (mean $19.5
million); in the high-anchor condition, it was $50 million (mean $51.9
million) (pp. 68-69).54
Anchoring and adjustment is a typical if not universal judgment
strategy for making quantitative estimates (pp. 216-17). If the anchor
is relevant and the adjustment is reasonably sufficient, the strategy
yields good enough estimates. The problem, however, is that people
tend to be unduly influenced by irrelevant or even absurd anchors,
and having selected an anchor (relevant or not), tend to make insuffi-
cient adjustments. All of this is well established in the cognitive
psychology literature going back to the classic work of Tversky and
Kahneman in the 1970s.55 So it is no surprise to find jurors faced with
an especially difficult estimation task -"magnitude scaling without a
modulus," as they put it (p. 41)-being particularly likely to rely
unduly on arbitrary anchors.
54. To emphasize that the difference in median awards between the high-anchor and low-
anchor conditions was "$35 million for an identical fact situation" (p. 73; see also p. 219) may
characterize jurors' cognitive pliability in a somewhat unduly pejorative way, to the extent that
readers treat the $35 million figure as independently meaningful ("Wow, that's a lot!") and not
as the experimental manipulation itself (the high-anchor was $50 million and the low-anchor
was $15 million). And both damages requests were plausible given the $24.5 million in
compensatory damages already awarded.
55. The authors (p. 73 n.9) cite the classic article, Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974). Kahneman is
coauthor of three of the book's chapters, although not chapter 4.
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Yet the authors' experiment showed that the plaintiff's award
request was actually the second most popular anchor according to
participants' own explanations for their judgments; the modal anchor
was the compensatory award (stipulated in the stimulus materials)
(pp. 68-69). The Supreme Court, in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,6 looked to the relationship between the punitive and compen-
satory awards as one factor in determining whether the punitive
award is unconstitutionally disproportionate. 7 This implies that the
participants most often chose to anchor their judgments in an argua-
bly justifiable number. 8 The difficulty of adjusting from the anchor
remains, of course, and neither the Supreme Court nor any other
legal authority has indicated the multiple (or fraction) of compensa-
tory damages jurors ought to employ to arrive at their punitive
awards (p. 248).19
The study reported in chapter 6 purports to show that, in decid-
ing whether to award punitives, jurors are also prone to the hindsight
bias, just as they are in every other legal judgment task with regard to
which possible hindsight effects have been examined. Participants
watched a videotaped narration and read a written summary of a case
in which the defendant railroad wanted to carry toxic herbicides along
a stretch of mountainous track that the National Transportation
Safety Board ("NTSB") had declared hazardous. In the foresight
condition, jurors were to decide whether the NTSB should lift its
order stopping the railroad's operations along the track before any
56. 517 U.S. 559, 580-83 (1996).
57. Viscusi (p. 112) implicitly uses "the extent of the harm" as an anchor for judging the
inappropriateness of a punitive award. See supra note 40.
58. Given this, the rhetoric of the concluding paragraph of the chapter (p. 74) seems
especially tendentious. The authors begin: "In conclusion, the present results reinforce the
description of punitive damages awards as highly variable and arbitrary," and, after remarking
on the range of awards, continue: "However, the two experiments reported in this chapter do
point to the fact that punitive damages awards can be influenced by predictable factors"-
namely the inappropriate factors of the plaintiff's lawyer's request and the geographical location
of the lead plaintiff. By omitting the predictability generated by the compensatory award, the
authors overstate the gap between participants' decision-making and the norm of rational
judgment.
59. On the other hand, one might even question whether the jurors who anchored their
judgments in the plaintiff's lawyer's request were really behaving completely irrationally under
the circumstances: without any other reliable guidance, they may well have deferred to the
figure chosen by an "expert"-a person they should have recognized as biased, but one they
might properly assume was as knowledgeable as anyone else about the value to be matched to
the defendant's reprehensible conduct. Given the law's complete lack of guidance as to how to
translate outrage at a defendant's conduct into a dollar amount, no anchor currently available to
juries can entirely avoid the label "arbitrary." In the book's concluding chapter, Sunstein
recommends providing the punitives decision-maker with anchors in the form of punitive
awards in comparable cases; I will discuss this promising suggestion later in the Review.
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accident occurred. In the hindsight condition, jurors were told that
the accident had occurred and that full compensatory damages had
been paid; jurors were asked to decide whether punitives should also
be awarded and, if so, in what amount (pp. 100-02).
Knowing that the accident that the defendant's behavior risked
had actually occurred led participants to estimate a higher ex ante
probability that it would occur. Two-thirds of participants in the
hindsight condition voted to award punitive damages; by contrast,
only one-third of those in the foresight condition decided that the
NTSB should not lift its order (i.e., that the railroad should not be
allowed to continue its operations). And hindsight made participants
significantly more likely to judge that each of the component ele-
ments of punitive damages liability (e.g., that the defendant was
reckless, that the defendant disregarded the risk of a grave danger,
etc.) was met than participants in the foresight condition were to
judge that each of the equivalent conditions for not lifting the NTSB
order was met (pp. 103-05).
Although not apparent from the authors' description of the ex-
periment (pp. 100-01), their earlier report of what appears to be the
same study and their stimulus materials indicate important differ-
ences in the information provided to participants in the respective
foresight and hindsight conditions (apart from the intended manipula-
tion of whether the accident occurred) which arguably confound their
results.60 Nevertheless, the hindsight effect has been so well estab-
lished by other research, if not also by the study reported in chapter 6,
that it is reasonable to believe that jurors' punitive damages decisions
may be prone to this effect. Such an effect would be normatively
unjustifiable. The hindsight effect constitutes a bias in relation to the
social scientific norm of rational judgment, as well as in the sense that
it makes jurors more likely to find defendants liable (for compensa-
tory or punitive damages). In addition, there is no known reliable
cure for the bias (pp. 107-08). So to the extent that the hindsight bias
affects punitive damages decisions, the authors' case for the irration-
ality of the jurors' decision-making regarding punitives would be
strengthened. 61
60. Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Failures of a Social
Science Case for Change, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 867 (1999) (reviewing Reid Hastie & W. Kip
Viscusi, What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 901 (1998)).
61. Nor does there appear to be any normative justification for jurors to grant larger
punitive damages awards to local as opposed to out-of-state plaintiffs, as the authors found in
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VI. ARE JURORS POOR RISK MANAGERS?
The authors (W. Kip Viscusi is the sole author of four of the five
chapters in this section) marshal several studies to show that when
making punitive damages awards, jurors are oblivious to the most
basic principles of optimal deterrence-the idea that in regulating
risky behavior, legal decision-makers ought to encourage actors to
avoid only those accidents worth avoiding (p. 109). Jurors incorrectly
estimate the magnitude of mortality risks. They seem incapable of
following instructions to take deterrence into account as a goal of
their punitive awards. And they are often unwilling to place a
reasonable dollar value on safety, as is required to determine whether
their award would promote optimal deterrence or not. Perhaps least
justifiably, they actually judge a defendant that competently per-
formed a cost-benefit analysis and decided that taking safety precau-
tions would cost more than the expected benefit in accident costs
more harshly than they do a defendant that simply declined to take
precautions without first weighing costs against benefits. Most of
these findings are sound, and cumulatively they paint a convincing
portrait of jurors as poor risk managers. That jurors should punish
defendants for weighing costs and benefits seems especially trouble-
some, even if this finding may not surprise observers of tort juries.62
In two of the studies, however, the authors' data does not entirely
justify the pejorative inferences they draw regarding jurors' unwill-
ingness and inability to implement the goal of deterrence.
the study reported in chapter 4. On the other hand, the jurors in the study reported in chapter 2
who assessed larger punitive awards against wealthier defendants (a "large" company with
profits of $100 million to $200 million per year as opposed to a "medium-sized" company with
profits one-tenth that large) may well have been legally justified in doing so. While this
defendant's wealth effect might suggest to some readers (as it apparently does to the authors, cf.
pp. 40, 113-14) an anticorporate defendant bias, it is perfectly legitimate for jurors to take the
defendant's wealth into account in deciding how much to punish the defendant, because all
things being equal, a greater award may be necessary to inflict equal punishment on a wealthier
defendant. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991) (defendant's wealth
one of several factors that may properly be taken into account in setting punitive award); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 15 (W. Page Keeton ed.,
5th ed. 1984). The authors conceal their own preference for the optimal deterrence goal of
punitives behind their assertion that "[w]ithin the academic community, opinion is sharply
divided on the question whether the amount of punitive awards should depend on the size of the
defendant firm" (p. 40); in fact, opinion is "sharply divided" only between those economic
theorists who think it is irrelevant and everyone else. See also Eisenberg et al., supra note 38, at
629 & nn.15-19 (noting that even some economic theorists allow that the defendant's wealth
may be relevant to punitives).
62. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
1013, 1035-36 (1991); Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The
Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 736 (1992).
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A. Jurors' Risk Perceptions Are Biased
The first requirement of a good risk manager would seem to be
the ability to appraise risks in a relatively objective, unbiased, and
accurate fashion. Laypeople's inability to do these things is well
documented, 63 and the experiments in chapter 10 confirm several of
these flaws. When participants were asked to estimate annual mortal-
ity risks from a variety of causes, they tended to overestimate the
frequency of unlikely causes of death (e.g., fireworks, botulism) and
underestimate the frequency of common killers (e.g., diabetes, stroke,
cancer). This kind of overestimation of low-probability risks would
incline jurors to hold the defendants who create those risks liable for
not taking steps to avoid them (pp. 180-83). A second cognitive bias
compounds the first. When presented with a range of scenarios in
which the expected accident loss was held constant but its component
values- the probability of an accident and the severity of the loss
should an accident occur-were manipulated, participants were
insufficiently sensitive to reductions in the probability of the accident.
Consequently, their thinking was dominated by the corresponding
increase in the magnitude of the potential loss, making defendants
who are responsible for large-loss but low-probability accidents (a
commonly litigated products liability scenario) especially vulnerable
to punitive damages (pp. 175-77). Then, when participants were
implicitly asked to place a value on life that could be plugged into a
cost-benefit calculus (specifically, they were asked how much they
would pay to cut their annual motor vehicle fatality risk in half, from
1 in 10,000 to I in 20,000), nearly 10% of participants responded
essentially that no amount was too much to spend on safety. This
"zero-risk mentality" is plainly not feasible as a matter of policy, and
would also lead participants to hold defendants liable for failing to
avoid risks even if they could have done so only by means of precau-
tions that were clearly not cost-effective (pp. 183-84).64 Finally, when
accident losses were described as uncertain (e.g., the defendant
actually caused $10 million losses but was fortunate in that there was
a 90% chance that losses could have been much worse, as high as
63. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463-89 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
64. The fewer than 10% of respondents who placed an infinite value on life may not have
much practical effect on jury decision-making, because there would rarely be more than one
such person on a six-person jury (p. 184).
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$100 million), many participants tended to award damages based on
the worst-case scenario-which, if done in all cases, would lead to
greatly excessive deterrence (pp. 177-80). When all of these robust
little irrationalities are cumulated, the result (experiment 1) is that
jurors tend to hold defendants liable for punitive (and not merely
compensatory) damages for failing to avoid a low-probability risk
even though the cost of avoiding that risk was greater than the
expected benefit in accident losses-so that, according to optimal
deterrence theory, the defendant should not be considered negligent,
much less reckless and thus potentially liable for punitives. 6
B. Jurors Punish Defendants for Conducting Cost-Benefit Analyses
To my mind some of the most interesting and telling results in
the book concern jurors' responses to a defendant's performance of a
cost-benefit analysis (chapter 7). In all scenarios, the defendant
automobile company knew that it had designed a line of cars with a
defective electrical system; the defect had led to ten burn deaths per
year. The researcher (Viscusi) manipulated whether the defendant
conducted a cost-benefit analysis before deciding not to fix the
design; whether, in doing the analysis, the defendant used a low
value-of-life figure (based on average compensatory damages awards)
or a high one (based on National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion data); and whether the analysis was based on a mistaken overes-
timate of the cost of precautions per life saved (pp. 115-21).
Far from being more lenient toward a defendant that could jus-
tify its actions on the ground that a competent cost-benefit analysis
showed that the cost of precautions exceeded expected accident
losses, participants punished the defendant more severely when it had
done such an analysis: the geometric mean of punitive damages
awards was one and a half times higher, and the median punitive
award was ten times higher, when the defendant had done the analy-
sis than when it had not.66 And when the defendant, in conducting its
65. I have already discussed this study in an earlier section of this Review. I will only
repeat here that the tendency of actual judges as well as jury-eligible adults to vote for punitives
where the accident was very unlikely (1 in 100,000 or 1,000,000) but the magnitude of the loss
was very great (29 or 290 deaths, respectively) may indicate not so much an insensitivity to
decrements in accident probability as it does a sensitivity to the value of life-not necessarily an
undue or even infinite sensitivity, just a judgment that when many lives are at stake, a company
ought to be judged reckless for not "overspending" on safety by $500 to fix a cargo door. (pp.
176-77).
66. The authors overstate their results in one small respect: in table 7.2 (p. 118), summariz-
ing the result of the comparison of jurors' awards in scenario 1 (no cost-benefit analysis, $4
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analysis, placed a higher value on life (using the government figure of
$4 million per life rather than the $800,000 figure based on compensa-
tory damages), participants again punished it for doing so, awarding
punitive damages that were 20% higher (geometric mean) or nearly
three times higher (median) (pp. 122-24).
Whether jurors' lack of receptivity to corporate cost-benefit
analyses should be "linked to anticorporate bias" (p. 113), as Viscusi
implies, is debatable, given at least equally compelling evidence of
jurors' generally probusiness attitudes.67 The experimental results are
better explained by other psychological phenomena. Viscusi, for
instance, suggests that jurors may punish corporations for risk-benefit
balancing because jurors may regard trading-off money and lives as
taboo,68 or because, when they judge in hindsight, the trade-off seems
to be not between costs and the low probability of an accident, but
between a small expenditure by a (big) company and an identifiable
death (p. 130).69 He also points out that the defendant's use of a
million per life) vs. scenarios 3-5 (cost-benefit analysis), the authors describe the finding as
"[slignificant effect with large influence on award level." The "large influence" is a euphemism
for a result that approaches but does not meet the conventional .05 standard for statistical
significance (here, t = 1.85, p < .10).
67. See VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL 138-77 (2000). Viscusi's support for his claim
on anticorporate bias is a 1998 survey published in the NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL (p. 114 n.7).
Such poll responses, however, are unlikely to be reliable predictors of respondents' behavior
should they actually become jurors, mainly because (1) people's responses to the very general
kinds of questions asked in this and most other polls (to use one of Viscusi's examples, whether
executives of big companies often try to cover up the harm they do) may very well differ from
their judgments as jurors with regard to the specific, vastly more detailed facts presented at trial
(given all of the evidence, did this defendant try to cover up harm?), and (2) when people
respond to surveys, their thinking and answers are not constrained by oath, adversarial
presentation and argument, and deliberation with fellow jurors. Moreover, whether any
"general suspicion of corporate motives" (pp. 113-14) on jurors' part would be unwarranted, as
Viscusi also implies, is also debatable, given the well-known incentives that corporations and
their officers have to value profit and professional advancement over customer safety. David
Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 371-74 (1998).
68. Cost-benefit analysis need not be and often is not confined to a trade-off between
safety and "costs" defined as decrements in the company's profits. Rather, costs are typically
understood to include as well the social costs of precautions, including the unavailability of
other desired products and decreases in safety due to the company's inability to take other,
possibly more efficacious precautions. The stimulus materials for at least one scenario used in
the experiment reported in chapter 7 appear to have presented participants with the broader
sense of costs (p. 120), but others did not (pp. 117-18). To the extent that participants were
allowed or encouraged to identify the cost side of the equation solely with lower company
profits, their anger at companies that used these cost-benefit analyses to justify their failure to
take precautions becomes more understandable; such participants might have been more lenient
had they believed that the defendants were not simply trading lives for money. (I thank my
colleague Linda Meyer for pointing out this argument to me.)
69. To put this point another way: when jurors hold defendants responsible for failing to
take (suboptimal) precautions to avoid low-probability events, they are not necessarily giving
vent to an anticorporate or antidefendant bias (see p. 233); they may be reflecting the difficulty
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higher dollar figure for the value of life, while it ought to have sig-
naled the defendant's greater concern for safety and thus led partici-
pants to perceive the defendant as less deserving of punishment,
probably offered participants a higher anchor for their awards (pp.
125-26). 70
Still another possibility is that the results reflect the operation of
prototype effects. Some or many of the participants who punished
the defendant more severely for conducting a cost-benefit analysis
may have reasoned that "car company, burn deaths, cost-benefit
analysis" equaled "Ford Pinto," which equaled "defendant is bad and
should be punished."'71 To be more precise, in the real Ford Pinto
case, jury outrage was likely based on certain perceptions regarding
Ford's behavior, such as what the jurors perceived to be Ford's
manipulation of the terms of the cost-benefit analysis it offered to
justify its refusal to redesign the car to avoid hundreds of burn deaths
and its vigorous lobbying against a government safety standard that
would have required it to redesign the gas tank.7 2 Participants in the
experiment may have been aware (even if vaguely) of these aspects of
the Ford Pinto case (and any other cases they believed to be similar)
and incorporated them into their prototype of the profits-over-safety
car company. In the absence of information that distinguished the
defendant from the prototype, participants assimilated the defendant
to the prototype, and reacted with corresponding outrage. Had the
stimulus materials more pointedly differentiated the defendant from
the prototypical corporate wrongdoer, however, participants' thinking
may well have displayed a contrast effect instead, leading to less
they have in using their ordinary, intuitive blaming schema to evaluate corporate behavior.
Jurors' blaming judgments typically array the blameworthiness of behavior along a continuum,
with intent-to-harm being judged the most reprehensible, followed by bringing about harm
knowingly or recklessly, and so on down to unforeseeable, accidental injury as the least
blameworthy. The shared outrage and intent-to-punish rankings reported in chapter 2 reflect
this common schema (pp. 24-25). Corporate behavior that causes physical injury, however, as
in the typical products liability setting, seems to be both accidental (which ought to indicate low
blame) and knowing (which ought to indicate high blame): if a company knows that one out of
every million widgets will cause harm, then if it makes enough widgets, it knows to a statistical
certainty that harms will occur. The result of this tension or dissonance may be judgments of
blame that are discrepant from the ones the schema routinely prescribes.
70. This resembles another instance in which jurors' use of anchors not only seems odd but
is precisely contrary to the aims of the entity that unwittingly provided the anchor-jurors' use
of statutory damage caps as an anchor for damage awards, which actually increase average
awards, contrary to legislative intent (see p. 218, where Hastie, citing the leading studies, makes
precisely this point).
71. See Schwartz, supra note 62 (mythic status of Ford Pinto case).
72. Cf. Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES Sept.-Oct. 1977, at 18; Schwartz,
supra note 62, at 1017-20.
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punitive behavior.73 Thus, the reported findings may not generalize to
situations in which the defense attorney presents evidence that
persuasively distinguishes the defendant's conduct from that of jurors'
prototype.
Viewing the findings in their best light, though, the participants'
judgments remain hard to justify. "The direction of the effect [of the
defendant's performance of a cost-benefit analysis on punitive
awards] is disturbing because jurors are doing the opposite of what
juries should be doing if corporations are to be encouraged to think
systematically about risk and cost trade-offs" (p. 124).14
C. Jurors Avoid Thinking in Terms of Economic Efficiency
Two other studies offer results that are internally valid but do
not quite support the broadly pejorative characterizations of punitive
damages juries that the authors draw from those results. In chapter 8,
the authors ask: "Do people want optimal deterrence?" (p. 132). The
answer, as one might expect by this point, is no. The argument is as
follows: if all accidents for which defendants were legally responsible
resulted in tort suits and (appropriate) compensatory damage awards,
then defendants would have to internalize all expected accident costs.
Out of self-interest they would risk incurring those costs only when it
was cheaper to do so than to spend on precautions to avoid them.
Thus, tort law would regulate accident-causing behavior in an eco-
nomically efficient fashion. Some accident-causing behavior goes
73. See Norbert Schwarz & Herbert Bless, Constructing Reality and Its Alternatives: An
Inclusion/Exclusion Model of Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Social Judgment, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 217 (Leonard L. Martin & Abraham Tesser eds.,
1992).
74. The same experiment also showed that jurors were not responsive to factors that ought
to have affected their judgments if they were thinking in terms of optimal deterrence: they did
not punish more harshly a defendant who could have avoided the accident at a lower cost ($1
million versus $4 million per life saved) (pp. 119-20), nor did they punish more harshly a
defendant who made a mistake in its cost-benefit analysis, calculating a cost of $4 million per
life saved when the actual amount was $2 million) (p. 126). Perhaps the manipulation of cost-
per-life-saved did not affect jurors' decisions because they considered even the more expensive
precaution cheap enough to be well worth taking, so that the perceived reprehensibility of not
taking worthwhile precautions to save life drowned out any differences in how much those
precautions would have cost. Note that even at $4 million per life saved, the precaution here is
pretty close to the NHTSA value of life figure ($3 million), so jurors might well have been
outraged at the defendant for taking such a chance with the lives of others. Perhaps a stronger
manipulation, including an experimental condition in which the precaution was obviously not
cost-effective (e.g., $100 million per life saved), would have produced a significant effect. And
perhaps similar observations apply to the lack of effect of the defendant's making a mistake in
the cost-benefit analysis (jurors may have thought: "Two million, four million, what's the
difference? The defendant should have avoided the harm in any case.").
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undetected, however, because injured persons cannot identify the
injury or the culpable party, or choose not to sue, or sue and lose
when they deserve to win. To make up for this shortfall in deter-
rence, in cases in which the defendant is sued and compensatory
damages are awarded, punitive damages should also be assessed, and
increased to the extent that the probability of detection is low.75
The authors' first experiment shows that participants' punitive
awards were unaffected by manipulations in the probability that the
defendant's tortious conduct would be detected, as optimal deter-
rence theory requires. (There is actually an insignificant trend in the
opposite direction: awards increased as the probability of detection
increased.) (pp. 137-38). In a second experiment, a majority of
University of Chicago law students disagreed with the decision of the
trial judge in the stimulus case to set aside the jury's punitive award
based on the judge's (uncontested) finding that punitives were not
needed to deter the defendant's conduct because the plaintiff would
receive full compensation. From these studies the authors conclude
that "[p]eople do not spontaneously think in terms of optimal deter-
rence, and their proposed punishments do not vary with the probabil-
ity of detection" (p. 141). People do not want optimal deterrence.
It is possible, as the authors suggest, that the pattern of punitive
awards indicates that people care about deterrence but just do not
understand how to implement it-specifically, that they do not
understand the connection that the authors posit between the prob-
ability of detection and optimal deterrence (pp. 138-39). I would go
further. It seems to me that these results support at most the proposi-
tion that people are unwilling to use deterrence to trump a punitive
award that they deem justifiable in terms of the other functions that
punitives serve (including retribution and the public declaration of
75. For a critique of the theory that punitive damages should be awarded if and only if
necessary to make up for a shortfall in deterrence created by the failure to detect acts of
negligence, see Mark F. Grady, Efficient Negligence, 87 GEO. L.J. 397, 397-98 (1998). In any
event, it is certainly inconsistent with current law. For instance, in BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-83 (1996), the Supreme Court used the size of the plaintiff's
compensatory damages and the size of the civil fines for misconduct comparable to the
defendant's as benchmarks for the proportionality and hence constitutionality of punitive
awards, thus indicating that punitives should be positively and not negatively correlated with the
extent of detection (i.e., the greater the liability to which the defendant is or would otherwise be
subject, the larger the permissible punitive damages award). Moreover, the Court explicitly
identified the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct as another "guidepost" for determin-
ing the reasonableness of the punitive award, quite apart from questions of deterrence.
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wrongdoing"6). In the second experiment, for instance, the defendant
company's injury-causing conduct was described as "grotesquely
reckless"; the facts stated that the defendant "did not even try to take
the most minimal and obvious precautions to protect workers against
serious risks to life and health" (p. 140). The majority of participants
who declined to endorse the trial judge's decision to set aside the
punitive award on the ground that compensatory damages would
provide adequate deterrence may very well have been happy to
further deterrence in other contexts,77 but here, they perceived it to be
so obvious that the defendant deserved punishment that they pre-
ferred to uphold the punitive award rather than eliminate it entirely
(which was the only choice presented by the experiment).
Or perhaps, as the authors suggest (p. 138), probability of detec-
tion is just too subtle a cue to trigger jurors' awareness of deterrence
concerns. In chapter 9, the authors offer strong evidence that jurors
do not follow punitive damages instructions that explicitly call their
attention to, explain, and even provide a formula for implementing
optimal deterrence. These instructions were proposed by A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell in a Harvard Law Review article, 78 and
are referred to as the "Polinsky-Shavell instructions" (pp. 142, 165-
66). The instructions on the "deterrence objective" consist of four
paragraphs, about 250-300 words, which no doubt are clear enough to
attentive, educated readers. For instance:
2. To achieve the deterrence objective, your principal task is
to estimate the likelihood that the defendant might have escaped
having to pay for the harm for which it should be responsible.
Thus, for example, if the harm was noticeable and likely to lead to a
lawsuit, your estimate of the likelihood of escaping liability would
be relatively low. But if the harm might not have been attributed to
the defendant, or if the defendant tried to conceal its harmful con-
duct, your estimate of the likelihood of escaping liability would be
relatively high (p. 165).
The deterrence instructions also include a table correlating the
probability of escaping liability (in percentage terms) with a "punitive
damages multiplier" (in decimal terms); jurors are supposed to
76. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1428-38 (1993); see infra p. 286 & n.7.
77. For example, data from the study reported in chapter 5 indicates that the occurrence
during deliberations of the proposition that the purpose of punitive damages is to deter others
was the strongest predictor that the jury would award punitives (p. 87).
78. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
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multiply the compensatory damages (specified in the scenario) to
yield the "base punitive damages amount" (p. 165), elsewhere called
the "deterrence value. ' 79 The instructions continue with about 200
words on the "punishment objective" of punitives and how to deter-
mine an appropriate "punishment amount." No table is offered here,
but rather guidelines such as:
3. In considering how well the imposition of punitive damages
will fulfill the punishment objective, you should also bear the fol-
lowing in mind: ... b) the extent to which you believe that innocent
parties will suffer as a result of the imposition of punitive damages
on the defendant; such parties might include shareholders as well as
customers, who may have to pay higher prices for the defendant's
products or services. The more likely it is that innocent parties will
be punished, the lower should be the level of punitive damages (p.
166).
The instructions conclude with about 100 words explaining that the
final punitive award should be between the deterrence and punish-
ment amounts.
The major finding is that "people did not carry out the Polinsky-
Shavell instructions in setting punitive damages" (p. 163). Across all
scenarios (in which the researchers manipulated, among other things,
the probability that the defendant's risky conduct would be detected
and whether an anchor for the punitive award was presented), 7% of
the participants simply did not provide a deterrence value (i.e., they
did not complete the seemingly straightforward computation, re-
quired by the deterrence instructions, of multiplying the compensa-
tory damages by the appropriate "punitive damages multiplier"
derived from the table); another 78% provided an incorrect value. So
most participants failed to correctly do the math they were instructed
to do. In scenarios in which the probability of detection was very low
(1%), so that the correct computation according to optimal deter-
79. So, for instance, if the probability of escaping liability is .5. the multiplier is 1.0-
punitives are equal to compensatory damages, so that the total tort liability (compensatory plus
punitives) is twice the accident losses; because the probability of detection is .5 (i.e., there was a
50% chance that actual losses would go uncompensated), doubling the damages is needed to
make liability equal risks created (.5 x 2 = 1), as is required for optimal deterrence to work. If
the probability of escaping liability is 90%, the multiplier is 9 (i.e., if the defendant had only a
10% chance of having to pay out any damages), setting punitives at 9 times compensatory
damages yields total liability of 10 times compensatory damages, so .1 x 10 = 1; again, liability
equals risks created. If the probability of escaping liability is 99%, the multiplier is 99. (Why
the left column of the instruction table is set in terms of "probability of escaping liability"
instead of the probability of detection, the complementary concept the authors choose to explain
optimal deterrence elsewhere (chapter 8), is unclear to me, though it would seem to add a
needless complication to the jurors' task.)
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rence (as indicated in the table in the instructions) would have been
to multiply compensatory damages by 99, participants' deterrence
values reflect their use of a multiple of less than 2, indicating that they
did not use the deterrence table as instructed. 80  Participants did,
however, raise their deterrence values (and overall punitive awards)
in response to anchors, whether purportedly irrelevant (plaintiff's
lawyer's request) or arguably more relevant (media report of punitive
award in a similar case). Finally, despite the Polinsky-Shavell instruc-
tions' clear emphasis on the deterrence objective, the punishment
value, not the deterrence value, played a larger role in participants'
final punitive damages awards (pp. 151-58).
Does the failure to follow the Polinsky-Shavell instructions show
that jurors simply cannot or will not grasp the deterrence function of
punitives? Perhaps a more modest conclusion would be appropriate.
The syntactical and conceptual complexity of the instructions, taken
as a whole, strongly suggests that even well intentioned and otherwise
capable participants may have decided to abandon their efforts to
comply and fallen back on their common sense notions of what
punitive damages are for.81 Viscusi, the chapter's author, writes that
"[m]any respondents are simply reluctant or unable to carry out even
the most basic mathematical calculations" (p. 164). Maybe-but
those calculations were set in a dauntingly complex set of verbal
instructions, so that many participants probably just gave up before
they bothered to do the math.8 2  "Moreover, [many respondents]
appear quite willing to abandon the jury instructions when they have
other rationales for setting punitive damages that they find to be
either more convenient or more compelling," and this "is consistent
80. The resulting awards were, however, much lower than they should have been, contrary
to the tenor of the results of other studies in the book.
81. Cf. p. 93, where the authors offer a similar explanation for mock juries' failure to follow
punitive damages instructions modeled on actual ones rather than on the Polinsky-Shavell
proposal.
82. Viscusi observes: "Perhaps most troubling is that these difficulties [in accurately
calculating the deterrence or 'base' punitive damages amount, taking into account the
probability of detection] are not random, but are highly concentrated among particular
demographic groups, specifically minorities and the less well educated" (p. 163). This is based
on correlations showing that significantly larger percentages of women, Hispanics, and those
with some college education or less are to be found among those who incorrectly determined
the deterrence amount than among those who determined it correctly (p. 161 & tbl. 9.5).
Viscusi speculates that the discrepancy "may be indicative of a greater reluctance by female
respondents to surrender their punitive damages judgment to a mathematical formula" (p. 161);
he does not, however, offer this rationalization for the other groups, whose disproportionate
failure to get the deterrence amount right is chalked up to "f[inding] the basic multiplication
tasks ... too difficult" (p. 163).
20031
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
with the performance of juries more generally" (p. 164). Maybe-but
it seems rather hasty to draw such broad inferences from participant
behavior that may very well reflect a situation-specific response to
these particular instructions. Rather than, or in addition to, criticizing
participants for failing to respond positively to the "detailed rationale
and mathematical formula for setting punitive damages" (p. 162),
Viscusi might have contemplated the possibility that the instructions
were too detailed (and yet still insufficiently clear) for the typical jury-
eligible adult to understand, and that an alternative, simpler set of
instructions might have yielded different results. 83
83. My argument in the text is based on the sheer complexity of the instructions, but the
instructions may also have failed to elicit compliance because they are steeped in a style of
thinking-consequentialist reasoning-with which participants were unfamiliar. The partici-
pants in this experiment were surely more accustomed to thinking in terms of punishment than
deterrence; as the authors of the preceding chapter write, "intuitive punishment judgments are
not tailored to consequentialist goals" (p. 135) and "[p]eople do not spontaneously think in
terms of optimal deterrence" (p. 141). Yet rather than seek to explain this unfamiliar way of
thinking in terms a typical adult might understand, perhaps by trying to reconcile the idea of
deterrence with that of punishment-as-retribution or at least address jurors' likely preference
for the punishment objective of punitives, see infra p. 285 n.2, the Polinsky-Shavell instructions
plow ahead and define both deterrence and punishment in consequentialist terms. Consider, for
instance, the respective opening sentences of the explanations of the deterrence and punishment
objectives. Deterrence:
Punitive damages fulfill the deterrence objective to the extent that they deliver a mes-
sage and warning to the defendant and to other similarly situated firms to take appro-
priate steps to prevent harm in the future. But punitive damages will not fulfill the
deterrence objective if they cause firms to take wasteful steps to prevent harm, if they
cause the prices of products and services to rise excessively, or if they cause firms to
withdraw socially valuable products or services from the market. (p. 165).
Punishment:
Punitive damages fulfill the punishment objective to the extent that they cause defen-
dants to penalize their blameworthy employees who engaged in reprehensible behav-
ior. In considering punishment, you should keep in mind that the defendant's payment
of compensatory damages already may lead to the punishment of blameworthy em-
ployees to some extent. (p. 166).
(The next paragraphs of the punishment instructions, one of which is quoted in the text, are also
entirely consequentialist in nature.) Faced with this consequentialist onslaught and no place to
put their retribution-based intuitions, some participants may very well have given up the
attempt to follow the instructions to the letter. (Some may not have gotten started.)
Or perhaps some participants reacted against the instructions' evident slant, not just to-
ward consequentialism but against awarding punitives at all, by jettisoning the instructions
altogether. (Of course, without any data in the form of participants' think-aloud protocols or
other appropriate measures of what they thought about the instructions, this hypothesis, like the
one above, is entirely speculative.) A reasonable person could well believe that the thrust of the
instructions was to discourage the awarding of punitives-both in blatant ways such as those
quoted above, and in more subtle ways as well. For instance, concerning paragraph 3.b of the
"punishment" instructions quoted in the text: since the imposition of tort damages on a
company may always, in theory, be reflected in charges on "innocent parties" like shareholders
(when company stock goes down) or customers (if prices are raised to cover liability costs),
when would not jurors be expected to lower their awards? And note that what paragraph 3.b
asks jurors to lower is not the "punishment amount," which ought to be the topic in this part of
the instructions, but the "punitive damages"-the ultimate award.
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VII. Do JUDGES Do BET[ER?
The preceding sections of this Review explain the extent to
which the experiments reported in the book show that jurors' and
juries' punitive damages awards and component judgments are biased
in relation to the rational judgment and economic norms of good
decision-making, respectively. With regard to each criterion it may
fairly be asked whether the likeliest alternative decision-maker-the
trial judge-would do any better. Research reported in chapter 11
indicates that, by and large, judges' punitive damages decisions are
less prone to cognitive bias and more capable of accommodating the
goal of optimal deterrence. For instance, judges, like jurors, dis-
played hindsight bias when evaluating the ex ante magnitude of a risk,
but, unlike jurors, their liability judgments were not affected by
knowing that the accident had occurred (pp. 189-90). Judges' deci-
sions matched cost-benefit principles better than jurors' did, so that
judges began to favor punitives only when the benefits of accident
avoidance (not taken) far exceeded the costs (again unlike jurors,
who seemed to favor punitives regardless of cost-benefit judgments)
(pp. 191-92). And while judges, like jurors, overestimate low-
probability mortality risks and underestimate high-probability ones,
judges' estimates form a better overall fit with actual data (pp. 200-
04). Unfortunately, the researchers do not seem to have asked judges
to determine dollar awards,8 so there is no way to compare the
variability of their awards to that of jurors-a critical omission, since
the excessive variability of awards is the authors' most serious charge
against juries' punitive damages decisions.
There is a considerable amount of research elsewhere tending to
show similarities rather than differences between jurors' and judges'
decision-making processes and damages awards. In a recent, careful,
and extensive review of this work (some of which she has herself
conducted), Jennifer Robbennolt writes:
The existing empirical research investigating decision-making
about other legal issues has shown that.., judges and jurors have
84. The authors did so in experiment 3 in chapter 11, testing judges' ability when setting
damages (in response to a very brief scenario) to screen out what might have occurred and focus
only on actual losses (pp. 198-200), but the authors do not report any variability data.
Interestingly, such data is reported in the article on which the relevant portion of chapter 11 is
based. W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 107 (2001). There Viscusi reported that jurors' damage awards were more variable than
judges', which would support the book's overall argument. See Robbennolt, supra note 23, at
150-57, for a discussion of this and other comparative studies.
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similar responses to statistical information, and that judges, not
unlike ordinary citizens, are unable to ignore inadmissible evidence
and are vulnerable to cognitive illusions such as hindsight bias, an-
choring, egocentric bias, framing, and the representativeness
heuristic.
[T]he empirical results provide a somewhat mixed picture of
possible differences between judges and jurors in the decisions they
make about damages... [but a]t this early stage of the research
there is no clear evidence to support the notion that judges will
make qualitatively different decisions than juries across cases.85
To their credit, the authors of the concluding chapters acknowl-
edge some of this research, twice referring specifically to Robben-
nolt's paper (pp. 234 & n.37; 257 & n.28). Their assertions in chapters
11 and 12 regarding "[t]he superior performance of judges" (pp. 207,
235), on the other hand, contrast a bit more dramatically with what
may reasonably be inferred from the bulk of the other research on
this topic.
VIII. Do JURY DECISIONS TO AWARD PUNITIVES REFLECT
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW?
Perhaps the strongest criticism that might be made of how juries
decide to award punitive damages is that they do not conform to the
legal norm-that juries do not follow the law. It is a serious criticism
because it is generally (and reasonably) assumed that the likeliest
alternative decision-maker (the judge) would do much better on this
score, and because it is the criticism most likely to be appreciated by
the public at large. An experiment already discussed (chapter 5)
offers compelling evidence that juries' punitive damages decision-
making does not fare well when measured by this standard.
In this study, over 700 jury-eligible adults deliberated in over 120
mock juries to decide whether to award punitive damages in one of
four scenarios, based on actual cases in which the courts ultimately
rejected punitives as a matter of law. As noted before, the majority
of these juries voted to award punitives. Content analyses showed
that the juries' attention to, use of, and understanding of the legal
prerequisites for awarding punitives, as set forth in the judge's
instructions,86 were incomplete at best. On average the juries dis-
85. Robbennolt, supra note 23, at 146-47, 152, 154.
86. The elements counted, based on actual and typical punitive damages instructions (app.
A at 259-60) included: (1) whether the defendant's conduct was malicious, or whether it was
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cussed only 3.13 of the 5 possible elements, and drew conclusions
about only 2.78 (p. 86). More importantly, juries that voted to award
punitive damages were significantly less likely than those that voted
not to award them to discuss or state conclusions about each of the 5
elements (p. 88). And the fewer the number of legal elements
considered, the more likely a jury was to vote for punitives (pp. 88-
89). Finally, 30% of the jurors did not get a single item right on a
postverdict recall-comprehension test on the instructions, and the
median score was only 5% correct (pp. 90-91).
A number of considerations may temper somewhat the apparent
force of these data. Juries may have thought that some legal elements
were too obviously satisfied to be worth discussing; thus, whether the
dangerous outcome occurred was the most frequently ignored ele-
ment (by over 50% of propunitives juries and over 30% of antipuni-
tives juries). In this light, the average number of elements considered
(3.13) or concluded (2.78) should perhaps be contrasted not to the
ceiling of 5 but to something lower. The recall-comprehension test
scores are so low, even by the usual fair-to-poor results obtained in
most studies of juror comprehension of instructions, that perhaps the
test instrument was unusually difficult and not a reliable measure of
jurors' working understanding of the relevant concepts." And the
inverse correlation between thoroughness of discussion and likeli-
hood of awarding punitives does not necessarily reflect a flaw or bias
unique to the punitive damages decision: in any situation in which
liability is premised on the satisfaction of all of the elements of a
conjunctive rule, the failure to pay attention to any one or more
elements will, all things being equal, increase the likelihood of a
conclusion of liability.88
reckless, where "recklessness" requires findings that (2) the defendant was subjectively
conscious of a particular grave danger or risk of harm, which was a foreseeable or probable
effect of the conduct, (3) the danger or risk in fact occurred, (4) the defendant disregarded the
risk in deciding how to act, and (5) the disregard of the risk was a gross deviation from
ordinarily reasonable behavior.
87. As was pointed out by Ellsworth, supra note 5, at 720-21. The authors address this
external validity issue by contending that their findings are consistent with other studies of real
and mock jury decision-making, and that, if anything, such features of their experimental design
as making written instructions available during deliberations would have been predicted to yield
higher levels of recall and comprehension than in the real world (pp. 91-92). Note also that
recall-comprehension significantly correlated with predeliberation verdict preference for only
one of the four cases (the better a juror's comprehension and recall, the more likely that juror
was to vote against awarding punitives) (p. 91).
88. By the same token, the structure of the participants' decision-making task-a
conjunctive rule, the proper application of which should have led to the conclusion that fewer
than all elements were satisfied and therefore that the defendant was not liable for punitives, see
2003]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Finally, the significant negative relationship between the thor-
oughness of juries' attention to the legal requirements for a punitive
award and their preference for punitives does not mean that igno-
rance of the law is the only explanation for their awards. Some of the
juries that awarded punitives, and thus decided differently from the
highest court to rule on the actual case, may have followed the law (at
least, as well as did the juries whose judgments agreed with the actual
decisions) but reasonably interpreted and applied it differently than
the judge(s) did. To that extent, discrepancies between judges' and
juries' punitive damage decisions may reflect legitimate, justifiable
disagreements about the policies or values reflected in the law and its
application to the case rather than, say, jury nullification or unwitting
deviation from the legal norm.89
These points notwithstanding, the results offer strong evidence
that the processes by which juries reason their way to punitive dam-
ages decisions sometimes do not conform to the legal norm. The
authors properly attribute this incomplete reliance on legal rules not
to jurors' lack of motivation, but to their recourse, in the face of a
difficult and complex judgmental task, to their everyday habits of
thinking about responsibility and blame (pp. 92-93). 90 It is possible
that the outcomes to which these common sense blaming habits lead
jurors would largely coincide with those of judges or other legal
experts; punitive damages juries could be "right for the wrong rea-
sons." 9' But divergence from legally prescribed decision-making
discussion above,-did not allow the researchers to determine whether, in other situations,
participants might make a different sort of error in failing to follow the law-adding an element
to those specified in the instructions and thereby finding a defendant not liable who satisfied all
of the legal elements of the rule. Cf. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay
Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991) (scenarios
in which a criminal defendant's conduct lacked certain elements of participants' prototypical
conception of the crime charged yielded fewer guilty verdicts than scenarios containing all
elements of the prototype, even though both scenarios met the legal definition of the crime). Of
course, while such outcomes could offset the authors' implication that jurors are biased against
defendants (at least when they decide punitive damages), they would compound the problem of
juror inaccuracy relative to the legal norm. (I thank my colleague Steve Gilles for emphasizing
this last point.)
89. See MacCoun, supra note 11, at 727; see also supra pp. 244, 249.
90. The authors mention, almost offhandedly, that jurors' "rough-and-ready everyday
reasoning habits [were] probably influenced by their sympathies for one party or the other" (p.
93; see also p. 223). Unfortunately they do not appear to have sought the data that would have
allowed them to test this, or any other, speculation about how jurors' emotions may have
affected their decisions. Considering that in the authors' own model of punitive damages
decision-making, an emotion-outrage-drives judgments (p. 32 fig. 2.1), it would have been
worthwhile to study in greater depth the role of emotions in those judgments.
91. NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS 104-11 (2000) (summarizing jurors' efforts to achieve "total justice" by using habits
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processes could very well increase discrepancies between juries'
punitive damages decisions and those of judges (p. 92) and/or other
expert observers, lending support to calls for reform. I turn next to
the book's concluding chapter, in which remedies are suggested for
what the authors perceive to be the ailments of punitive damages
juries.
IX. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Cass Sunstein, the author of the book's last chapter, recommends
two sorts of measures to address the arbitrariness and variability of
juries' punitive damages awards, as described by the studies in the
preceding chapters. The more modest is to encourage judges to
exercise greater oversight of juries' punitive awards. In particular, the
judge should make sure that the jury's award is in line with awards in
similar cases (pp. 248-51). The more ambitious proposal is to replace
juries as punitive decision-makers altogether with a schedule of
punitive damages determined by "specialists in the subject matter at
hand" (p. 258), analogous to workers' compensation and other
administrative payment schemes (pp. 252-55). Sunstein also contem-
plates various intermediate "mixed approaches" (pp. 255-57).
The recommendation that a given punitive damages award be
constrained by the range of awards in similar cases seems very
sensible. While defining the set of similar cases may be a matter of
dispute, almost any such set would provide at least a more relevant
and meaningful anchor for the punitive dollar judgment than any
currently used, and at most a determinate range for each award,
thereby addressing major sources of current variability and arbitrari-
ness (the unbounded scale, the absence of relevant anchors, and the
presence of irrelevant ones). As long as counsel are permitted to help
identify the comparison cases92 and to argue in exceptional circum-
stances for an award outside the range, it is hard to see how this
of thinking and feeling that often do not match the decision-making processes prescribed by law
but usually yield results that are consistent with those of legal experts).
92. Sunstein does not explicitly state but implies that the judge would identify the
comparison cases as part of his or her review of the jury's verdict. Without the lawyers' input,
the selection of comparison cases would itself shift a great deal of punitive decision-making
authority from juries to judges; certain groups of awards (those approved by appellate courts
would presumably predominate) would likely become widely used, creating a kind of judicial
punitive damages schedule (consisting of ranges rather than single numbers). Sunstein
recognizes and applauds this; after all, even in this "modest" proposal he would be happy for
judges to play an "exclusive" (p. 248) role in determining punitive dollar awards.
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proposal would be less fair than the current system. But once the
comparison cases have been chosen, there would not seem to be any
particular reason for the judge rather than the jury to choose the
appropriate dollar figure within that range, as Sunstein seems to
prefer (pp. 248-49).91 After all, the authors' own research (chapter
11) shows that judges as well as jurors are prone to some of the
cognitive biases that affect punitive awards, albeit in some cases to a
lesser degree, 94 and that above all, judges would share with jurors the
"difficulties in mapping normative judgments onto dollar amounts"
(p. 257).
The "more dramatic and radical shift" would be to move away
from jury determinations of punitives entirely toward a damages
schedule on the administrative model (p. 242):
As compared with the current approach, such a system would
have many advantages. It would simplify matters, thus reducing the
costs of litigation and decision. It would dramatically increase pre-
dictability. It should increase fairness, by ensuring that similarly
situated people will be treated similarly. To the extent that officials
seek to pursue optimal deterrence, a system of civil fines could be
designed with that goal in mind (p. 253).
Sunstein mentions half a dozen other administrative schemes for
determining compensation and/or penalties, including workers'
compensation schedules, criminal sentencing guidelines, and social
security disability determination grids, as precedents for his proposed
"schedule of fines and penalties" (p. 252). Beyond stating that the
punitives schedule "would be developed after extensive discussion
93. Sunstein acknowledges the possibility of judicial review of jury determinations as one
of his "mixed approaches" (pp. 255-57).
94. Also, one of these studies (chapter 11, experiment 5) indicates that judges placed a
much lower mean dollar value on life ($3.6 million) (p. 206) than the $5 million figure derived
from labor market data (based on the implicit valuations workers make when they accept extra
pay for higher-risk jobs) (p. 183); the mean valuation by jury-eligible participants responding to
the same question was $5.1 million (p. 184). Thus, juries' punitive awards would be more likely
than judges' to reflect community sentiment (cf. pp. 40-41, where the authors point out that the
supposed ability of a jury's punitive award to reflect community sentiment is seen as one of its
major functions), at least to the extent that the level of outrage that drives the award depends
on the value the community places on the well-being that the defendant's conduct threatened. I
might add that in characterizing judges' and jurors' value-of-life figures, the author of chapters
10 and 11 (Viscusi) seems to engage in less than even-handed treatment. The jurors' mean
value, which is almost exactly at the midpoint of economists' values, is described as "quite
reasonable and in line with estimates in the literature" (p. 184), while the judges' values -which,
as noted, are much further from that midpoint-"seem to be somewhat low, but [are] by no
means outside of the range of estimated value-of-life statistics in the literature.... [Tihe general
order of magnitude of the [judges'] responses seems appropriate" (p. 205). This description
reduces the disparity between the two sets of judgments and minimizes jurors' superior
performance relative to the scale the author himself has posited.
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within the democratic process, discussion informed by specialists in
the topics at hand" (pp. 252-53) and would be overseen by adminis-
trative officials, he does not offer any more detailed description of the
program.
This proposal raises three concerns. First, without a better idea
of the factors that would be considered in setting awards and the
dollar ranges that might be viewed as appropriate penalties for
different kinds and degrees of reckless or malicious misconduct, it is
difficult to say how well the proposal would accomplish its express
purpose of correcting for the perceived arbitrariness and unpredict-
ability of the current system. Even if the relevant factors are speci-
fied, there may be a considerable range of disagreement and hence
unpredictability in judges' or administrators' applications of those
factors.95 Second, in the attempt to define penalties that are both
appropriate and predictable, the scheme may become so complex and
rigid that it disserves rather than promotes fairness-as has arguably
been the case with the sentencing guidelines Sunstein offers as one of
his models.96 Third, the shift of authority in deciding punitives from
juries to judges or administrators may be opposed on political
grounds. Sunstein recognizes this and argues: "To those who think
that this [proposal] is an unacceptably undemocratic measure, the
best response might involve the workers' compensation system[,
which] ... commanded an extraordinary consensus from those
frustrated by the unreliable use of jury awards" (p. 255). The prob-
lem with this analogy is that workers' compensation laws promised
(and delivered) something to each camp: employers and their insurers
got caps on damages, while injured workers and their families got
more certain recovery.97 By contrast, the proposed administrative
scheme may very well give defendants their caps, but it does not seem
to offer the injured any increase in the likelihood of receiving a
punitive damages benefit (at least, one cannot discern from the
information provided that such an effect is likely).
95. For this same reason, it is not clear whether the proposed system would indeed increase
fairness, because the specified factors and/or the ways in which they are applied might subject
people who are similarly situated (according to important definitions of "similarity" extrinsic to
the schedule) to dissimilar treatment.
96. See, e.g., Kate Stith & Jos6 A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1997).
97. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 65-72 (1967).
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One set of recommendations that Sunstein does not make might
help reduce the perceived arbitrariness if not also the unpredictability
of awards with a minimum of dislocation to current practices. This
would involve amending jury instructions on punitive damages to
make them clearer, and requiring special verdicts to encourage juries
to pay attention to each and every legal prerequisite for making a
punitive award. Current instructions are far from ideal, and the study
reported in chapter 9, as discussed above, does not in any way support
the conclusion that jurors would not be able to follow truly clear and
simple instructions. Perhaps most importantly, current instructions
do not even attempt to address jurors' likely preconceptions regard-
ing punitives. Research has shown that while jurors' adherence to
their everyday notions of blame and responsibility may impede them
from complying with typical instructions, revised instructions that
acknowledge those common sense conceptions and explain how the
law differs elicit greater compliance. 98 Requiring juries to complete a
special verdict form would not prevent them from deliberating as they
like and then retrofitting their conclusions into the form, but it would
be predicted to increase those measures of juror attention to the law
that the authors' own research found most lacking (chapter 5).99 Such
improvements would be entirely compatible with the use of punitive
damages awards in comparable cases as a constraint on, or at least
anchor for, juries' decisions and/or judicial review thereof, as Sunstein
recommends.
CONCLUSION: WHAT ARE PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR?
Implicit in much of the research program and results reported in
Punitive Damages and explicit in the concluding chapter is the
authors' normative view of punitive damages. In this view,
predictability and rationality are the primary virtues of punitive
98. Diamond & Casper, supra note 48 at 534, 558 (participants in antitrust case who were
told not only that the law would treble their compensation awards but also the reason for the
trebling and why they should not reduce their award to adjust for it gave larger (and thus more
appropriate) awards than did those who were told only that their awards would be trebled or
that the awards would be trebled but that they should disregard the trebling); Vicki L. Smith,
When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993) (instructions
designed to address and revise participants' pre-existing prototypical conceptions of crimes led
to more accurate decisions than instructions that ignored those prototypes or told participants
to disregard them).
99. See Elizabeth C. Wiggins & Steven J. Breckler, Special Verdicts as Guides to Jury
Decision Making, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1990) (special verdicts somewhat increased
comprehension of jury instructions, but participants' impressions of the parties rather than
verdict form were strongest predictors of their decisions).
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ability and rationality are the primary virtues of punitive awards, and
optimal deterrence is the most important goal that they should strive
to achieve.' °  These virtues and this goal are linked in the list of
advantages, quoted earlier, that would accrue when erratic punitive
damages juries, antipathetic to cost-benefit thinking, are replaced by
administrators applying a predetermined schedule of civil penalties
with the goal of optimal deterrence built in.
It is hard to imagine a liability system providing optimal deter-
rence without predictability. But one could easily have predictability
without optimal deterrence-for instance, punitive damages could
simply be prohibited, or, at the other extreme, every defendant found
liable for punitives could be assessed a $10 billion penalty. Yet what
is obviously wrong with these schemes is not that they would be
inefficient, though they probably would. It is that they would be
unfair. 101 Under neither regime would most malicious or reckless
tortfeasors receive their just deserts. If tort law is going to be in the
punishment business at all (as it is if punitive damages are allowed, or
even a system of civil penalties as the authors recommend), then the
punishments should be in some sense proportionate to the blamewor-
thiness of the conduct, or the punishment scheme will lose its basis in
the community's common sense of what justice requires. 12
100. I do not believe that I am overstating this point. It is true that Sunstein, having
introduced the five chapters of studies on jurors and judges as risk managers with an explana-
tion of optimal deterrence, goes on to say:
These ideas are controversial, and we do not, as a group, intend to take a position on
them here. Some people insist that the purpose of punishment is to ensure retribution
rather than optimal deterrence. We suggest only that many policy analysts believe that
the task of the legal system is to create penalties that are high enough to produce ade-
quate deterrence, but not so high as to produce overdeterrence" (pp. 109-110).
The authors' research program itself endorses the importance of the optimal deterrence goal-
more than half of the descriptive portion of the book is devoted to studies designed to
determine whether jurors are up to the task of optimal deterrence, and concludes that they are
not (as compared to the other norms). Later, Sunstein notes that one of the advantages of his
proposal to replace jury decision-making with an administrative damages schedule is that "[t]o
the extent that officials seek to pursue optimal deterrence, a system of civil fines could be
designed with that goal in mind" (p. 253); no such accommodation of the goal of retribution (for
instance) is promoted, or sought.
101. Cf. California's "three strikes" law, mandating a minimum sentence of twenty-five
years to life for a felony conviction if the defendant has previously been convicted of two or
more violent or serious crimes. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2002). The law has been widely
criticized as unfair, and has led prosecutors in some counties to exercise their discretion in a way
that restores some proportionality to the punishment scheme (but at the same time violates the
uniformity and predictability sought by the "rule of law"). See Joshua E. Bowers, "The Integrity
of the Game is Everything": The Problem of Geographic Disparity in Three Strikes, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1164 (2001).
102. Experimental research confirms that lay people's punishment decisions are driven by
just deserts rather than deterrence. Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence
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This is precisely what the retribution goal of punitive damages
both permits and requires. Retribution has to do with the wrongness
of a defendant's conduct rather than (solely) the magnitude of the
harm the defendant has inflicted (which, considered prospectively, is
the concern of deterrence theory).103 Punishment informed by the
goal of retribution allows society to inflict "a publicly visible defeat
on the wrongdoer," thereby reaffirming society's moral standards. °4
Retribution has traditionally been recognized as a purpose of puni-
tives 05 and the Supreme Court has approved of itY' 6  The typical
reference in punitive damages jury instructions to the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct (e.g., p. 13) makes sense only in terms of
the retribution goal. In short, while retribution is not the only legiti-
mate aim of punitive damages, it is certainly one such aim. 107
At the heart of any fair retributive scheme, as noted, is propor-
tionality or just deserts. 08  And the best way to keep punishments
attuned to the community's sense of just deserts is to maintain the
community's role in administering those punishments. The constitu-
tional recognition of jury decision-making attempts to ensure that the
legal decisions to which it applies will reflect not only judicial and
legal norms (embodied in the substantive and procedural law the
judge administers) but also the community's values and common
sense, as each jury reflects them. The authors would exclude the
community's traditional role in self-governance as expressed in the
and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284 (2002);
see also NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE 334-37 (1995) (proportionality as
hallmark of common sense justice).
103. Galanter & Luban, supra note 76, at 1432.
104. Id.
105. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269 (1993).
106. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).
107. Note that Sunstein, in the passage quoted in footnote 100 above, writes as if either
retribution or optimal deterrence may be accepted as the goal of punitive damages. I see no
reason why the legal system must opt for one or the other. Indeed, it has been argued that
liability and punishments based on just deserts (as determined by the community's shared
principles of justice) would create the best deterrence. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). Nor are the purposes that jurors impute to
punitive damages limited to deterrence and retribution. For instance, jurors may also use
punitives as compensation for injured plaintiffs (especially if they believe that the compensatory
damages will not adequately serve this function, as some participants in the authors' research,
who were not allowed to decide compensatories themselves, might well have believed) and/or as
a way of achieving restorative justice. Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun,
Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 313 (1999).
108. Galanter & Luban, supra note 76, at 1432; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 105, at 1320.
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determination of punitive damages awards and replace it with mana-
gerial expertise in the form of risk analysis. They facilitate this move
by simply omitting the retribution goal from the normative vision
supporting their appraisals of juries' punitive damages decisions. The
authors' construction of a research paradigm based on the norm of
optimal deterrence has both interest and value, as I hope I have
recognized in previous sections of this Review. Their failure, how-
ever, to explain and justify their reliance on optimal deterrence to the
exclusion of retribution in their evaluations of jury behavior-how big
a "problem" juries' punitive damages awards are and what, if any-
thing, ought to be done in response-is a major drawback of their
work.10 9
Once the authors take out of the picture what juries may be most
capable of doing well (making particularized judgments of just
deserts) and confine their evaluative standards to what juries are least
equipped to do well (managing risks the way risk analysts would), it is
not surprising that they find juries' punitive damages awards to be so
flawed, especially in their variability. Reinstating the retributive goal
puts the authors' focus on the predictability of awards in a different
light. To the extent that one focuses, as Punitive Damages does, on
optimal deterrence as the goal of punitives, considerable predictabil-
ity may be both demanded and reasonably expected. 110 In contrast,
there are severe limits to how much predictability we can reasonably
expect of decisions that are finely tuned to the particular facts of each
case, and especially to nuances in the blameworthiness of the defen-
dant's conduct and its consequences, as determinations of just deserts
ought to be. Furthermore, the authors' characterization of jurors'
punitive damages awards as arbitrary (relative to the norms they
109. The authors might also have confronted some of the theoretical, see, e.g., Neal K.
Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385 (1997), and practical, see, e.g., DON
DEWEES, DAVID DUFF, & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT
LAW (1996) (discussing equivocal evidence for deterrent effects of punitive damages and other
tort liability rules in products liability, environmental, and other types of cases), difficulties in
identifying what deterrence is optimal and whether punitives (or civil fines) might plausibly
achieve it.
110. More generally, however, the authors may be demanding more predictability than a
complex or even chaotic system like that of civil litigation, across case types and jurisdictions
and over time, can possibly offer. Priest's statement in the introduction to the book-"it is an
appropriate subject of concern to observe any important legal outcome that appears unpredict-
able and that cannot clearly be explained by principle" (p. 2)-is surely excessive as applied to
individual punitive damages awards; as applied to the pattern of decisions as a whole, the degree
of predictability that might reasonably be expected rises (that's just the law of large numbers)
but the power of any one or more principles to account coherently for all outcomes radically
shrinks (as Critical Legal Studies scholars and the Legal Realists before them established).
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employ) should be augmented by an examination of how well those
awards may serve the goal of just retribution."' The broader point,
once again, is that judgments that may appear defective in terms of
the economic norm may be quite rational and appropriate when
viewed in terms of a different, entirely justifiable norm of jury deci-
sion-making."
2
How well do those awards serve the retributive goal? I do not
know, although I suppose that experimental research could help
address the question." 3 The authors of Punitive Damages are not to
be faulted for not adding such studies to the exceptionally broad and
fruitful research program they have already completed. However,
had they sought to explain at greater length their emphasis on opti-
mal deterrence to the exclusion of retribution and to justify the
standards of predictability against which jurors' and juries' awards
were measured and found wanting, they might have allowed readers
to draw from their extensive and valuable data somewhat different
conclusions about the state of punitive damages practice and the need
to reform it.
111. Thus, Sunstein's assertion that "when there is a wide range of possible awards, and
when differences among them cannot be explained by reference to factors in the case, the legal
system is not complying with the aspirations of the rule of law" (p. 247) may be insufficiently
sensitive to case factors that (properly) affect retributive responses, and may set too high a
standard for the consistency required by the "rule of law."
112. See Tetlock, supra note 12, at 464.
113. The authors might argue that the extent of variability of juror or jury responses to
identical scenarios that they found in their research indicates that those awards cannot be doing
a very good job of implementing a rule or principle of proportionate justice. Such an inference
would be premature. It could be that different jurors or juries could reasonably assign different
weights to the arguably culpable aspects of a defendant's conduct, resulting in (justifiable)
variability in inputs to the proportionality judgment, and/or that they could reasonably assign
ranges of appropriate dollar sanctions for any given level of perceived reprehensibility, resulting
in (justifiable) variability in outputs reflecting a proportionality judgment.
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